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HE major developments in the field of civil procedure during the
survey period occurred through judicial decisions, statutory enact-
ments,' and amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 2
This Article examines these developments and considers their impact on
existing Texas procedure.
* B.S., Texas A&M University; LL.B., University of Texas; LL.M., Southern Method-
ist University. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
** B.B.A., New Mexico State University; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attor-
ney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
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1. The enactments that have procedural implications principally concern the award of
interest in judgments, Act of May 17, 1983, ch. 107, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 518 (codified at
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.05 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1983)); electronic
filing of instruments, Act of May 26, 1983, ch. 732, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 4505 (codified at
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 29f, §§ 1-3 (Vernon Supp. 1984)); excuse from jury service,
Act of May 17, 1983, ch. 134, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 617, 620 (codified at TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 2133 (Vernon Supp. 1984)); jurisdiction of the justice court, Act of May 17,
1983, ch. 133, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 616 (codified at TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2385
(Vernon Supp. 1984)), and Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 733, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 4508 (codified
at TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2460a, §§ 2, 5, 5a, 11 (Vernon Supp. 1984)); limitations,
Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 744, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 4530 (codified at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 13.01 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983)); mandamus jurisdiction of courts of appeals, Act of
June 19, 1983, ch. 839, 1983 Tex. Gen. laws 4767, 4768 (codified at TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 1824 (Vernon Supp. 1984)); referral of suits by agreement for disposition by a
retired judge, Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 917, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 5060 (codified at TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 200d, §§ 1-13 (Vernon Supp. 1984)); subpoena of bank records,
Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 525, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 3056, 3057 (codified at TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. arts. 342-701, -705 (Vernon Supp. 1984)); transfer of actions among district,
county, and statutory probate courts, Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 958, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws
5228 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5B (Vernon Supp. 1984)); and venue, June 17,
1983, ch. 385, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2119 (codified at TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995
(Vernon Supp. 1984)).
2. The amendments modified twelve rules. These changes became effective Sept. 1,
1983. See Civil Procedure: Court Promulgates New Rules, 46 TEX. B.J. 858, as corrected, 46
TEX. B.J. 969 (1983) (special pull-out section). Following the period covered by this Article
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure were amended in further respects. See Rules of Civil
Procedure, 47 TEX. B.J. (Feb. 1984) (special pull-out section listing newly adopted rules).
These changes, which are numerous, became effective Apr. 1, 1984, and will be discussed in
the 1985 Survey.
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I. JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
Seay v. Hall,3 a case of first impression, addressed the jurisdiction of a
statutory probate court to adjudicate the claims of a wife-administratrix
for wrongful death and for personal injury arising from her husband's
death. Generally, section 5(d) of the Texas Probate Code4 authorizes a
statutory probate court to hear all matters incident to estates and, accord-
ing to section 5A(b),5 all claims by estates fall within this grant. A dece-
dent's estate consists of real and personal property, 6 and personal property
includes choses in action.7 The Seay court reasoned that because a claim
for personal injury under the survival statute8 is one that survives the dece-
dent and may be asserted by the representative of the estate,9 it is an asset
of the estate and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of a statutory probate
court. 10 Regarding the wife's claim for wrongful death the court held that
the statute creating it ' I made the claim personal to her and, accordingly, it
was not an asset of the estate. 12 For that reason, the court concluded, the
claim for wrongful death was not within the jurisdiction of a statutory pro-
bate court. ' 3
The practical effect of the holding in Seay was to require separate trials
of almost identical claims arising from the same transaction. Section 5B of
the Texas Probate Code 14 was recently enacted to restore judicial economy
in this area. It permits a judge of a statutory probate court, on the motion
of an interested party, to transfer to his court, from a district, county, or
statutory court, any cause of action appertaining or incident to an estate
pending before him. After the transfer, section 5B empowers the judge to
consolidate the transferred cause of action with the proceeding pending
before him. ' 5
Article 2385,16 which delineates the subject matter jurisdiction of a jus-
tice court, was recently amended to authorize a justice court to hear civil
matters in which the amount in controversy, exclusive of interest, is one
thousand dollars or less. 17 Hence, in cases in which the matter in contro-
versy exceeds two hundred dollars but does not exceed one thousand dol-
3. No. 05-82-00574-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
4. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5(d) (Vernon 1980).
5. Id. § 5A(b).
6. Id. § 3(1).
7. Id. § 3(z).
8. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5525 (Vernon 1958).
9. See Castleberry v. Goolsby Bldg. Corp., 617 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Tex. 1981); Mitchell
v. Akers, 401 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1966, writ ref d n.r.e.).
10. No. 05-82-00574-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
I1. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 4671 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1941-1983), 4675
(Vernon 1940).
12. No. 05-82-00574-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
13. Id.
14. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 958, Tex. Gen. Laws 5228 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE
ANN. § 58 (Vernon Supp. 1984)).
15. Id.
16. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2385 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
17. Act of May 17, 1983, ch. 133, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 616 (codified at TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 2385 (Vernon Supp. 1984)); see also Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 733, § 2, 1983
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lars, the county court shares concurrent jurisdiction with the justice
court. 18
II. JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
The propriety of out-of-state service under article 2031b,19 the Texas
long-arm statute, continues to be the subject of judicial attention. Section
3 of article 2031 b authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident
when he is "doing business" in Texas.20 Doing business, as defined by
section 4, includes "entering into contract by mail or otherwise with a resi-
dent of Texas to be performed in whole or in part by either party in this
State."'2' Despite the broad language of section 4, the opinion of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Hydrokinetics, Inc.
v. Alaska Mechanical, Inc. 22 indicates that a choice-of-law provision in a
contract may be a limiting factor in a jurisdictional determination in a suit
on the contract. The plaintiff, a manufacturing concern located in Texas,
sued the defendant, an Alaskan contractor that worked exclusively on
projects within Alaska, on a contract that was negotiated in both states.
The contract was closed in Texas, but it stipulated that it was to be gov-
erned by the law of Alaska. The contract concerned certain equipment
that the plaintiff was to manufacture at its facilities in Texas and deliver to
the defendant in Washington; however, the contract required that payment
for the equipment be made to the plaintiff in Texas. When the defendant
rejected the equipment and refused to make payment, the plaintiff filed
suit in Texas and effected service under article 2031b. Apart from the
transaction sued on, the defendant had had no contacts with Texas. Ac-
knowledging that the transaction had several connections with the forum,
the Fifth Circuit nevertheless concluded that the significance of these con-
tacts was diminished by the provision in the contract requiring it to be
construed under the laws of Alaska and affirmed the trial court's dismissal
of the claim against the defendant. 23
Relaxing the "long arm" of article 2031b, a federal district court con-
cluded during an earlier survey period that the activities in Texas of a
subsidiary corporation should not be imputed to its foreign parent for ju-
risdictional purposes, thereby compelling the court to overrule nonresident
service on the parent.24 Samuels v. BMW of North America, Inc. 25 focused
on a variation of the same situation and is instructive on the economics
Tex. Gen. Laws 4508 (codified at TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2460a, §§ 2, 5, 5a, II(Vernon Supp. 1984)) (amending justice court small claims procedure to new $1000 limit).
18. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1949 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
19. Id. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964 & Pam. Supp. 1964-1983).
20. Id. § 3.
21. Id.§4.
22. 700 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1983).
23. Id. at 1029.
24. Murdock v. Volvo of America Corp., 403 F. Supp. 55, 57-58 (N.D. Tex. 1975);
Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 364 F. Supp. 243, 244-48 (N.D. Tex. 1973); cf.
Bland v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp., 338 F. Supp. 871 (S.D. Tex. 1971) (minimum con-
tacts established jurisdiction, but jurisdiction not solely based on parent-subsidiary relation-
1984]
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underlying such a decision. The plaintiff brought suit in a federal district
court in Texas against two corporate defendants, one a subsidiary of the
other, seeking recovery on a products liability theory for personal injuries
arising from a Texas automobile accident involving a BMW automobile.
The automobile was manufactured by the parent company in Germany,
distributed through and marketed by the subsidiary in the United States,
and apparently purchased by the plaintiff in Texas. Although the subsidi-
ary did not contest the court's jurisdiction over its person, the foreign par-
ent, which was neither incorporated nor licensed to do business in Texas,
challenged the service on itself in a motion to dismiss. In response, the
plaintiff claimed that the foreign parent delivered a defective product into
Texas through its wholly owned subsidiary, that the product injured the
plaintiff in Texas, and that, since this occurrence amounted to the commis-
sion of a tort in Texas, the foreign parent was subject to the jurisdiction of
the court.
Reducing the inquiry to whether it was reasonable to require the parent
to defend the suit in Texas,26 the court focused on the economics of the
situation. Emphasizing that the subsidiary, a profitable and solvent firm,
had not challenged jurisdiction, the court reasoned that the plaintiff could
obtain effective relief, should he prevail at trial, from the logical defend-
ant, the subsidiary. According to the court, "[t]o force the parent to defend
itself for the alleged acts of its autonomous, solvent subsidiary has the un-
fortunate and unnecessary effect of increasing the costs of exporting to the
U.S. ''27 As a result, the court held that requiring the parent to defend
alongside the subsidiary under such circumstances served neither a legal
nor an economic purpose and dismissed the parent from the action. 28
In Bamford v. Hobbs29 a federal district court recently followed the "fi-
duciary shield" principle30 and applied it to determine the amenability of
the nonresident officer of a foreign corporation to service under article
2031 b for acts he performed in the forum state on behalf of the corpora-
tion.3' The plaintiffs sued the foreign corporation and its officer on several
causes of action, effecting service under article 203 1b. Regarding the of-
ship). See generally Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 491-99 (5th Cir.
1974) (discussing constitutionality of art. 203 1b).
25. 554 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Tex. 1983).
26. Id. at 1193.
27. Id. at 1195.
28. Id. at 1194-95.
29. 569 F. Supp. 160 (S.D. Tex. 1983).
30. The "fiduciary shield" principle provides: "[I]f an individual has contact with a
particular state only by virtue of his acts as a fiduciary of the corporation, he may be
shielded from the exercise, by that state, of jurisdiction over him personally on the basis of
that conduct." Marine Midland Bank v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899, 902 (2d Cir. 1981); accord
Weller v. Cromwell Oil Co., 504 F.2d 927, 929 (5th Cir. 1974) (jurisdiction over corpora-
tion's individual officers cannot be based solely upon jurisdiction over corporation); Wil-
shire Oil Co. v. Rifle, 409 F.2d 1277, 1281 n.8 (10th Cir. 1969) (even if foreign corporation is
subject to service because it transacts business through agents operating in forum state, such
agents are not engaged in business so as to allow application of long-arm statute to them as
individuals unless agents transact business on their own behalf apart from corporation).
31. 569 F. Supp. at 168.
[Vol. 38
TEXAS CIVIL PROCEDURE
ficer, the plaintiffs argued that the court had jurisdiction over him person-
ally because of his actions in Texas as a representative of the corporation.
Declining to sustain service over the officer, the court observed that a cor-
porate officer whose only contact with the forum is through performance
of his official duties is not subject to personal jurisdiction in the forum by
virtue of such contact. 32 Rather, concluded the court, "[a]n individual
may have his corporation's contacts with the forum attributed to him only
if there is an alter ego relationship between the two that justifies a court in
disregarding the separate corporate entity. '33
The Supreme Court of Texas concluded during a previous survey period
that service under article 2031 b is not complete until the secretary of state
forwards process to the nonresident defendant. 34 To establish the jurisdic-
tion of the trial court over the defendant's person, the record must affirma-
tively show that the process was forwarded. 35 Vanguard Investments v.
Fireplaceman, Inc. ,36 a recent decision by a Houston court of appeals, held
that this showing may be made by filing a certificate of mailing issued by
the secretary of state.37
Verges v. Lomas & Nettleton Financial Corp. 38 concerned a relatively ob-
scure provision of article 2031b. Section 5 of that article stipulates that
when process is delivered to the secretary of state under article 2031 b for
forwarding to a nonresident defendant, the secretary of state "shall require
a statement of the name and address of the home or home office of the
non-resident" to facilitate such forwarding. 39 The record in Verges re-
vealed that the secretary of state received only the last known address of
the defendant and that the process he forwarded to that location was re-
turned bearing the notation "unclaimed." The plaintiff obtained a default
judgment based on the service, and the defendant sought to have it set
aside, arguing noncompliance with section 5. Finding that the last known
address was not the equivalent of the "home or home office" address re-
quired by the statute, the appellate court ruled that the plaintiff had not
fulfilled the requirements of section 5 and invalidated the judgment.40
One final case bearing on personal jurisdiction should be of interest to
the trial attorney. Fidelity Union Life Insurance Co. v. Orr4 l involved a
32. Id.; see Forsythe v. Overmyer, 576 F.2d 779, 783 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
864 (1978); Lakota Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Havey Fund-Raising Management, Inc., 519
F.2d 634, 637 (8th Cir. 1975); Siskind v. Villa Found. for Educ., Inc., 642 S.W.2d 434, 437
(Tex. 1982). See generally Figari, Graves & Dwyer, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 37 Sw. L.J. 289, 292 (1983) (discussing corporate officers' amenability to
service).
33. 569 F. Supp. at 168-69.
34. Whitney v. L & L Realty Corp., 500 S.W.2d 94, 96 (Tex. 1973).
35. Id.
36. 641 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
37. Id. at 656; see Figari, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw.
L.J. 248, 248 n.7 (1974).
38. 642 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
39. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 203 1b, § 5 (Vernon 1964).
40. 642 S.W.2d at 823.
41. 648 S.W.2d 36 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
19841
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suit by an insurance company against a soliciting agent on a contract that
required all payments under it to be made to the company in Dallas,
Texas. Upholding service on the agent, the court, following earlier deci-
sions,42 found the obligation requiring payment in Texas to be of critical
importance and concluded that the agent's contacts comported with due
process.43
III. SPECIAL APPEARANCE
Haskell v. Border City Bank 44 is a judicial warning that rule 120a, which
authorizes a defendant to appear specially for the purpose of questioning
whether he is amenable to process, 45 cannot be used to raise the issue of
defective service. A plaintiff must generally allege facts in his petition
showing that he is entitled to effect substituted service under a particular
statute. 46 The Haskell court emphasized, however, that since the sole issue
at a special appearance is one of personal jurisdiction, a defendant may
not attack a deficiency in service allegation through such procedure. 47
Rule 120a also has been a source of uncertainty for a party attempting to
establish his position on personal jurisdiction at a special appearance hear-
ing. In particular, due to the rule's failure to specify the type of proof the
court may receive at such a hearing, the propriety of using affidavits for
this purpose has been in doubt. Adhering to a strict approach, the court in
Haskell condemned the use of affidavits for this purpose and ruled them
inadmissible as evidence at special appearance hearings.4 8
IV. SERVICE OF PROCESS
A number of decisions during the survey period invalidated service of
process on the basis of inadvertent errors occurring during the execution of
service. In Plains Chevrolet, Inc. v. Thorne 49 the citation was officially ad-
dressed by the clerk to "General Motors Corporation"; however, after the
serving officer received it, he wrote the name "Plains Chevrolet" immedi-
42. Marathon Metallic Bldg. Co. v. Mountain Empire Constr. Co., 653 F.2d 921, 922-23
(5th Cir. 1981); La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc. v. Schmelig Constr. Co., 617 S.W.2d 827, 828
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 198 1, no writ); Gubifosi v. Buddy Schoellkopf Prods.,
Inc., 545 S.W.2d 528, 536 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ); National Truckers Serv.,
Inc. v. Aero Syss., Inc., 480 S.W.2d 455, 459 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972, writ refd
n.r.e.).
43. 648 S.W.2d at 38.
44. 649 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983, no writ).
45. TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a.
46. See McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927, 929-30 (Tex. 1965); Flynt v. City of King-
sville, 125 Tex. 510, 511, 82 S.W.2d 934 (1935).
47. 649 S.W.2d at 134.
48. Id. at 135; accord Main Bank & Trust v. Nye, 571 S.W.2d 222, 223 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In contrast, when an objection to personal jurisdic-
tion is asserted in federal court, affidavits represent a proper method of proof. See, e.g.,
Edwards v. Associated Press, 512 F.2d 258, 262 n.8 (5th Cir. 1975) (appropriate to consider
affidavits when resolving jurisdictional disputes); O'Hare Int'l Bank v. Hampton, 437 F.2d
1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1971) (courts may receive and weigh affidavits when considering juris-
dictional challenge).
49. 656 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. App.-Waco 1983, no writ).
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ately above the typed name and served it, noting that he had delivered it to
"Plains Chevrolet Company." Finding that the handwritten addition
amount to an impermissible amendment of the citation, the court held that
once the clerk had issued the citation, it could only be amended by author-
ity of the trial court. 50 For this reason, the court held the service to be
invalid and reversed a default judgment based on it.51
A similar error occurred in Stephenson v. Corporate Services, Inc. ,52 in
which the citation named "Franklin National Corp., Ltd." as a defendant,
but the serving officer recited in his return that he had delivered process to
"Franklin National Corp." On appeal from a default judgment against
the company, the appellate court concluded that, while strict compliance
with service requirements is required in such a situation, the failure of the
serving officer to write the word "Ltd." after the word "Corp." was not
fatal.53 Observing that the petition the officer had served sufficiently indi-
cated to its recipient that it was directed to Franklin National Corp., Ltd.,
thus providing the defendant with an opportunity to appear and defend
the action, the court approved the service and upheld the default judgment
based thereon. 54
Finally, in Travieso v. Travieso55 a curious omission by a serving officer
in completing his return led to an invalidation of service and a reversal of
the resulting default judgment. When the serving officer completed his
return, he certified that process had been delivered to the defendant but
omitted to state the name of the sheriff or constable on whose behalf he
was acting. Rule 107, which governs the requirements for proper return of
citation, specifies that the return should "be signed by the officer offi-
cially."' 56 Finding that the service did not satisfy the requirements of rule
107, the court emphasized that when citation is served by a deputy, com-
pliance occurs only when he identifies the official for whom he is acting as
deputy.57
V. VENUE
In response to consistent criticism of the Texas venue scheme over the
years, 58 the 68th Legislature enacted Senate Bill 898 during the survey pe-
riod, completely overhauling article 1995, the Texas venue statute. 59 Less
50. Id. at 633.
51. Id.
52. 650 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, writ ref d n.r.e.).
53. Id. at 184.
54. Id.
55. 649 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ).
56. TEx. R. Civ. P. 107.
57. 649 S.W.2d at 820.
58. See Guittard & Tyler, Revision of the Texas Venue Statute: A Reform Long Overdue,
32 BAYLOR L. REV. 563 (1980); LangleyA Suggested Revision of the Texas Venue Statute, 30
TEX. L. REV. 547 (1952); Spradley, Texas Venue. The Pathology of the Law, 36 Sw. L.J. 645
(1982).
59. Act of June 17, 1983, ch. 385, § I, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws. 2119-24 (codified at TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1964-1983) [hereinafter cited as Article
19841
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
than a month after passage of the senate bill, the Texas Supreme Court
complemented the lawmakers' measure by promulgating new rules of pro-
cedure governing venue hearings.60 The amended statute and rules be-
came effective September 1, 1983, substantially altering Texas venue
practice.
Like its predecessor, 61 amended article 1995 provides a general rule of
venue for all causes of action; it also lists various exceptions to the general
rule that are either mandatory62 or permissive, 63 depending on the sub-
stantive nature of the cause of action or the particular status or capacity of
the defendant. 64 In contrast to the old statute, however, amended article
1995 provides the plaintiff with two venue options under the general rule.
Suits can now be brought in the county of defendant's residence, if the
defendant is a natural person, or in the county where the cause of action,
or a part thereof, accrued.65 The addition of the county where the cause of
action accrued as a proper venue under the general rule carries forward
the substance of several former exceptions and, therefore, these exceptions
no longer appear in the statute.66
The new statute includes seventeen exceptions to the general rule that
are either mandatory or permissive.67 Mandatory exceptions specifically
1995] (amending TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995 (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1982-1983)
[hereinafter cited as Article 1995 (repealed)]).
60. Order of June 15, 1983, reprinted at 46 TEX. B.J. 858-59 (1983).
61. Article 1995 formerly provided, as a general rule, that a defendant shall be sued in
his county of domicile. As of January 1983, 34 exceptions to this general rule existed under
the old statute. See Article 1995 (repealed).
62. The seven mandatory exceptions are codified in § 2 of the amended statute. Article
1995, § 2. The mandatory exceptions clearly control over both the general rule and the
permissive exceptions, but the new statute creates no priority among the mandatory excep-
tions themselves. See Article 1995, §§ 1, 2. Under the old statute, courts looked to the intent
of the legislature in determining which of the mandatory exceptions controlled. See I R.
MCDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE IN DISTRICT AND COUNTY COURTS § 4.05 (F. Elliott
rev. ed. 1981).
63. The 10 permissive exceptions are in § 3 of the amended statute. Article 1995, § 3.
Id. § 3(h) specifically incorporates all other statutory prescriptions of permissive venue.
64. For example, exceptions to the general rule exist under amended art. 1995 for cer-
tain causes of action relating to contracts, Article 1995, § 3(c), (e); torts, id. §§ 2(g), 3(d);
land, id. § 2(a); specific types of injunctive relief, id. § 2(b), (c); and mandamus actions
against certain types of persons or entities, id. § 2(d). Other exceptions exist if the defendant
is a county, id. § 2(e); a certain type of insurance company, id. § 3(b); a corporation or
partnership, id. § 3(f), (g); a transient, id. § 3(i); or a nonresident of the state, id. § 3(j).
65. Article 1995, § 1. The new general rule substitutes the county of the defendant's
residence for the county of his domicle as a location of proper venue. This change in the
wording of the statute, however, is of little significance since courts had previously treated
the terms "domicle" and "residence" as synonymous for venue purposes. See Snyder v.
Pitts, 150 Tex. 407, 409, 241 S.W.2d 136, 139 (1951).
66. Most notably, the statute eliminated as unnecessary the former exceptions for cer-
tain tort actions such as fraud, negligence, and crime or trespass. See Article 1995(7), (9),
(9a) (repealed).
67. The former exceptions that have been deleted in whole from the new statute related
to fraud, negligence, crime or trespass, attachment and sequestration, personal property, in-
heritances, partition, breach of warranty of title, divorce, labor disputes, revision of probate,
forfeiture of corporate charters, forfeiture of railway lands, carriers, railroad wages, and
fraternal benefit societies. See Article 1955(7), (8), (9), (9a), (10), (11), (13), (15), (16), (17a),
(18), (21), (22), (24), (26), (28a) (repealed).
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apply to certain actions involving lands, 68 injunctive actions to stay other
lawsuits69 or to restrain execution of judgments, 70 mandamus actions
against the head of a state department, 7' actions against a county,72 and
suits for libel, slander, or invasion of privacy. 73 The statutory section ad-
dressing mandatory venue also includes an exception incorporating the
mandatory venue provisions of any other statute.74 Permissive exceptions
exist for, among other things, suits for breach of warranty by a consumer
goods manufacturer, 75 suits on written contracts requiring performance in
a particular county, 76 and suits against insurance companies,77 corpora-
tions, associations, and partnerships, 78 foreign corporations, 79 nonresi-
dents,80 and, in certain instances, executors.8 '
Although many of these exceptions, both mandatory and permissive, are
identical to their counterparts under the old statute, amended article 1995
changes the venue treatment of certain types of actions or entities covered
by the exceptions. For example, the amended statute has deleted suits for
damages to land or to prevent waste as a basis for invoking the mandatory
exception concerning land actions.8 2 Suits to recover real property or an
interest therein, for partition, and to remove encumbrances or quiet title to
real property, however, continue to be maintainable, and indeed must be
brought, in the county where the land is situated.83 Likewise, although the
mandatory exception for libel and slander actions continues to list the
same venue options as the old statute, the new exception differs to the ex-
tent it also covers suits for invasion of privacy. 84 Of perhaps greatest sig-
nificance to practitioners, however, is the change the new statute effects
6.1. Article 1995, § 2(a) (venue in county where property or part thereof is located).
69. Id. § 2(b) (venue in county where suit is pending).
70. Id. § 2(c) (venue in county where judgment was rendered).
71. Id. § 2(d) (venue in Travis County).
72. Id. § 2(e) (venue in county sued).
73. Id. § 2(g) (venue in county of plaintiff's residence at time cause of action accrued,
county of defendant's residence at time suit filed, county of defendant's residence at time
action accrued, or county of corporate defendant's domicle).
74. Id. § 2(f).
75. Id. § 3(c).
76. Id. § 3(e)(1) (venue in county where defendant's performance required).
77. Id. § 3(b) (venue in county where policyholder or beneficiary resides, among other
permissible venues).
78. Id. § 3(f).
79. Id. § 3(g).
80. Id. § 3(j) (venue in county of plaintiff's residence).
81. Id. § 3(a) (in suits to establish money demands venue in county where estate admin-
istered). This exception also provides that suits against executors, administrators, or guardi-
ans for negligence of the person whose estate is represented may be brought in the county
where the negligent act or omission occurred. Id.
82. Compare Article 1995, § 2(a) with Article 1995(14) (repealed).
83. Article 1995, § 2(a). The inclusion of partition suits in the exception is new; it came
from subdivision (13) of the former statute, which the legislature otherwise completely elimi-
nated. See Article 1995(13) (repealed). Unlike the former exception, however, the excep-
tion for venue in partition suits in the amended statute is mandatory, and the action can only
be brought in the county where the land or a part thereof is situated. Compare Article 1995,§ 2(a) with Article 1995(13) (repealed).
84. Compare Article 1995, § 2(g) with Article 1995(29) (repealed).
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with respect to the venue treatment of actions against corporations. Sec-
tions 3(f) and 3(g) of amended article 1955 provide the plaintiff suing a
corporation with the same venue options he had before;85 however, these
exceptions have now taken on added importance due to the alteration of
the general venue rule. As a general rule, actions are now maintainable in
the county of defendant's residence only if the defendant is a natural per-
son.86 Accordingly, proof that a defendant corporation "resides" in a par-
ticular county because its registered office or agent is there87 is apparently
no longer sufficient to establish venue.88
Further, amended article 1995 completely displaces court-developed
principles of ancillary venue. Section 4 of the new statute89 essentially
codifies the long-standing Middlebrook doctrine, 90 which provided that a
court with venue of a single claim against a defendant also had venue as to
all properly joined claims against that defendant.9' Article 1995 expands
the principle to include multiple parties as well. Thus, a plaintiff can now
sue two or more defendants in a single county as long as venue is proper as
to one of the defendants and all of the remaining defendants are proper
parties.92 Finally, the new statute ends the preexisting confusion about
venue of cross-actions. 93 Section 4(b) provides that venue of the main ac-
tion shall establish venue of a counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party
claim properly joined under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.94
85. Compare Article 1995, § 3(f), (g) with Article 1995(23), (27) (repealed).
86. Article 1995, § 1.
87. See Ward v. Fairway Operating Co., 364 S.W.2d 194, 195 (Tex. 1963) (holding that
a corporation could always be sued at its registered office since such office constituted a
statutory place of residence.
88. Under the amended statute, venue still appears to be proper in the county where a
corporation has its registered office or agent if the defendant is a foreign corporation, or if
the defendant is a domestic corporation and the plaintiff also resides in that county, because
the registered office or agent should qualify as an agency or representative. See Article
1995, § 3(f), (g). Unless the registered office is also the principle office, however, a plaintiff
who sues a domestic corporation and who does not live in the same county as the corpora-
tion's registered office may be forced to file his suit elsewhere. See id.
89. Id. § 4(a).
90. See Middlebrook v. David Bradley Mfg. Co., 86 Tex. 706, 706, 26 S.W. 935, 935
(1894).
91. Like the Middlebrook doctrine, however, § 4 does not permit the additional claims
to be joined if they are subject to an exception that mandates venue in a different county.
Article 1995, § 4(a).
92. 1d. The propriety of venue in multiple party situations was formerly the subject of
subdivisions 4 and 29a of the statute. See Article 1995(4), (29a) (repealed). The new statute
is more lenient, however, dispensing with the requirement that the additional defendants be
necessary parties. Compare Article 1995, § 4(a); with Article 1995 (29a) (repealed).
93. The problem was particularly acute in third-party actions. According to Union Bus
Lines v. Byrd, 142 Tex. 257, 259, 177 S.W.2d 774, 776 (1944), third-party actions for contri-
bution and indemnity were treated as independent suits for venue purposes. The subsequent
enactment of TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1984), the Texas com-
parative negligence statute, appeared to overrule the holding in Union Bus Lines, but the
courts of appeals disagreed about the statute's interpretation. The matter was not finally
resolved until the recent decision in Arthur Bros., Inc. v. U.M.C., Inc., 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.
143, 143-44 (Dec. 15, 1982) (per curiam), discussed in Figari, Graves & Dwyer, supra note
32, at 296. The decision in Arthur Bros., however, established the rule of ancillary venue
only as to negligence cases.
94. Article 1995, § 4(b).
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The new venue statutes and rules have also combined to drastically alter
the procedures for establishing, challenging, and proving venue in the trial
court, as well as contesting venue decisions in the appellate courts. To
begin with, defendants no longer have a privilege to be sued in the county
of their residence; 95 instead, the issue is simply whether the county of suit
is a proper venue and, if not, whether the county to which the defendant
seeks transfer is a proper venue.96 Accordingly, the supreme court has
amended the rules to delete references to the former plea of privilege, and
the rules now speak in terms of a motion to transfer.97 More importantly,
the defendant is no longer limited to seeking transfer to the county of his
residence or a county of mandatory venue;98 the venue choices open to the
plaintiff under the permissive exceptions are now equally available to the
defendant. 99
A motion to transfer venue is the procedural vehicle by which the de-
fendant challenges venue. °0 With two exceptions, a motion to transfer is
waived if it is not made in writing and filed prior to or concurrently' 0 ' with
the movant's first responsive pleading, other than a special appearance. 102
The motion must (1) allege either that the county where the suit is pending
is improper or that a mandatory provision applies and (2) request a trans-
fer of the case to a specific county of mandatory or proper venue.'0 3 Fur-
ther, the motion must plead the venue facts supporting transfer and state
the legal basis for the transfer.' °4 If the movant relies on a mandatory
venue exception, he must clearly designate the applicable statutory provi-
sion.'10 5 Finally, verification of the motion is not required, although the
movant may support his motion with affidavits in order to prove the al-
95. This conclusion is obvious in light of the change to the general rule and the supreme
court's amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which eliminated all references
to the plea of privilege. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 84-89, 93, 120a, 385, 527; compare Article 1995,
§ 1; with Article 1995 (repealed).
96. See Article 1995, § 4(c).
97. See, e.g., TEX. R. Civ. P. 86, 87.
98. See O.F. Mossberg & Sons, Inc. v. Sullivan, 591 S.W.2d 952, 957 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1980, no writ).
99. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 86; Article 1995, § 4(c).
100. TEX. R. Civ. P. 86(2).
101. Although the statute and the rules retain the due order pleading requirement with
respect to venue challenges, the allowance for concurrent filings of separate instruments
should eliminate highly technical questions about which instrument was entered on the
docket first when a motion to transfer and an original answer are filed at the same time. Id.;
see Industrial State Bank v. Eng'g. Serv. & Equip., Inc., 612 S.W.2d 661, 663 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1981, no writ), discussed in Figari, Graves & Dwyer, Texas Civil Procedure,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 36 Sw. L.J. 435, 447 (1982).
102. Article 1995, § 4(c); TEX. R. Civ. P. 86(I), 120a. Although the issue is not free from
doubt, motions to transfer by consent or due to inability to obtain an impartial trial can
apparently be filed after a responsive pleading has already been filed. See Article 1995,
§ 4(c)(3); TEX. R. Civ. P. 86(1), 87(5), 257. But see Article 1995, § 4(c)(2).
103. TEX. R. Civ. P. 86(3).
104. Id. In the event the defendant seeks transfer to a county where the cause of action
accrued, the rules allow him to plead hypothetically, without admitting the existence of a
cause of action, that "if a cause of action exists, then the cause of action or part thereof
accrued" in the specific county to which transfer is sought. 1d. 87(2)(b).
105. Id. 86(3).
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leged venue facts. 10 6
The plaintiff is not required to file any response to the motion to trans-
fer. Rule 87(3)(a) provides, however, that all venue facts, when properly
pleaded, are taken as true unless specifically denied by the adverse
party. ' 0 7 Consequently, if the plaintiff desires to challenge the propriety of
venue in the county to which defendant seeks transfer, he must file a re-
sponse specifically denying the venue facts pleaded in the motion to trans-
fer. Likewise, unless the defendant specifically denies venue facts alleged
by the plaintiff in his original petition, those facts will also be deemed
established.
The party filing a motion to transfer has the duty to request a hearing on
the motion, and each party is entitled to forty-five days notice of the hear-
ing. 0 8 The plaintiff must file any response or opposing affidavits at least
thirty days before the hearing, and a reply or additional affidavits support-
ing the motion are due not later than seven days before the date of
hearing. '0 9
The venue hearing itself completely differs from the former practice
under article 1995. Plaintiffs who previously relied on a statutory excep-
tion that pemitted suit in the county where the cause of action accrued
were required to prove the existence of their cause of action by a prepon-
derance of the evidence."10 In contrast, the new rules eliminate the need to
conduct a mini-trial on the merits of the venue hearing. Venue determina-
tions are now based solely on the pleadings, affidavits, and any stipulations
between the parties;"' l factual proof concerning the merits of the case is
not required in order to establish venue."l 2 Most importantly, in order to
maintain venue in the county of suit, the plaintiff need only make prima
facie proof that either the general rule or an exception applies."13 More-
106. Id. 86(3), 87(2), (3). If the plaintiff chooses to file a response, it also need not be
verified. Id. 86(4).
107. If a venue fact is specifically denied, the party pleading that fact must make prima
facie proof by filing affidavits fully and specifically setting forth facts supporting the plead-
ing. Id. 87(3)(a).
108. Id. 87(1). Unfortunately, neither the statute nor the rules provide for sanctioning
the defendant who fails to promptly present his motion for hearing. Consequently, since
nothing in the rule prohibits the party opposing transfer from setting the hearing, the plain-
tiff is well-advised to set the hearing himself if the defendant is using the motion to transfer
venue as a means of delaying the lawsuit.
109. Id. The time periods for filing responses, replies, and affidavits, or providing notice
of the hearing, may be modified upon leave of court. 1d.
110. See Employer's Casualty Co. v. Clark, 491 S.W.2d 661, 662 (Tex. 1973).
111. TEX. R. Civ. P. 87(3)(b). The court may also consider depositions, answers to inter-
rogatories, and other discovery products in making its venue determination as long as they
are attached to, or incorporated by reference into, an affidavit of a party, witness or attorney
who has knowledge of the discovery. Id. 88.
112. Article 1995, § 4(d)(1); TEX. R. Ctv. P. 87(2)(b).
113. TEX. R. Civ. P. 87(3)(c), Prima facie proof is made if the venue facts are properly
pleaded and fully supported by duly filed affidavits. Id. 87(3)(a). Thus, it appears that a
plaintiff must now plead appropriate venue facts in his original petition in order to prevail at
the motion to transfer hearing. See id. 87(3)(c). Not clear, however, is whether the plaintiff's
response to the motion to transfer can supply the requisite pleading allegations if the allega-
tions are not in the petition.
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over, if the plaintiff fails to establish that venue is proper, the case is not
automatically transferred pursuant to the defendant's privilege; instead,
the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that venue is proper in the
county to which transfer is sought." 4 If neither party initially makes the
required showing, the court may direct that further proof be made. 115 Fi-
nally, the parties no longer have a right to a jury determination of the
venue question. 116
Generally, once the court has ruled on a motion to transfer it will con-
sider no further motions to transfer in the case, even if the movant is a
party that was added after the venue proceedings.' '7 A joined party whom
this rule precludes from moving to transfer may still file a motion to trans-
fer, but only for the purpose of preserving the venue issue on appeal."18
The new venue provisions, however, prohibit interlocutory appeals of
venue rulings. 119 Instead, the venue question is now appealed together
with any appeal from the trial on the merits. 2 0  Section 4(d)(2) of the
venue statute provides that, in examining the venue issue on appeal, the
court "shall consider the entire record, including the trial on the merits," 12
and an improper venue determination at the trial court level is automati-
cally reversible error. 122
Amended article 1995 also provides for the transfer of a case to another
county of proper venue in two additional situations. First, it allows trans-
fer if an impartial trial cannot be had in the county where the action is
pending. 2 3 In this connection, the statute merely continues the former
practice under rules 257-259, although adjustments were necessary to the
procedures those rules prescribe. 124 For example, it now appears that in
cases of alleged inability to obtain an impartial trial, the court is to make
its determination solely on the basis of the affidavits, rather than relying on
114. Id. 87(a). The rules impose the same pleading and proof requirements on the de-
fendant with respect to the propriety of venue in the county designated in the motion to
transfer. See id. 86, 87.
115. Id. 87(3)(d).
116. Id. 87(4).
117. Id. 87(5). Exceptions to this rule exist for motions to transfer based on inability to
obtain a fair trial, see id. 257-59, and motions by subsequently added parties alleging the
application of a mandatory venue provision as to them, provided that the claim of
mandatory venue was not available to the previous movant. Id. 87(5).
118. Id. 257-258. Indeed, the appellate point will be lost unless a motion to transfer is
filed.
119. Article 1995, § 4(d)(l); TEX. R. Civ. P. 87(6). Section 2 of the bill amending art.
1995 repealed TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. 2008 (Vernon 1964), which authorized interlocu-
tory appeals of venue judgments. Act of June 17, 1983, ch. 385, § 2, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws
2119, 2124.
120. Article 1995, § 4(d)(2).
121. Id. The proper application of this provision is not entirely clear and must await
judicial interpretation. Moreover, the section seems fraught with opportunities for abuse,
which may lead the courts to interpret "shall" as merely directory rather than mandatory,
thereby providing the courts with some leeway on appeal.
122. Id.
123. Id. § 4(c)(2).
124. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 257-259.
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live testimony. 125 Moreover, if the trial court grants the motion, it must
transfer the case to a county of proper venue, if one is available. Accord-
ingly, the case is now transferred to a county in the same or adjoining
district only if venue is proper in that county or if no county of proper
venue exists anywhere other than the county of suit. 126 Finally, the new
statute expressly permits transfer of a case to another county of proper
venue upon the written consent of the parties at any time. 12
7
VI. PLEADINGS
Rule 94 imposes an obligation on litigants to specifically plead affirma-
tive defenses and identifies a number of defenses that are within its
scope.128 Two cases during the survey period illustrate that the list of de-
fenses in rule 94 is not exclusive. In France v. American Indemniy Co. 129
the supreme court held that the defenses of abandonment and election of
remedies are affirmative in nature and are not raised by a general de-
nial.' 30 Similarly, in Matrix v. Provident American Insurance Co. 131 the
court of appeals ruled that the defense of offset is a defense within the
contemplation of rule 94 and must be affirmatively alleged.' 32
For the practitioner whose client faces a default judgment under the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA), 33 Village Square, Ltd v.
Barton ' 34 may provide basis for relief. Appealing from a default judg-
ment, the defendant in Barton claimed that the plaintiffs DTPA allega-
tions were inadequate to support the judgment. Relying on the general
rule that a petition must "state an ascertainable cause of action and the
125. Compare id. 258 (challenge of change of venue motion determined by affidavit) with
id. 258 (1976) (if change of venue motion challenged by affidavit, judge can determine issues
formed by trial).
126. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 259.
127. Article 1995, § 4(c)(3); see TEX. R. Civ. P. 86(1) (discussing timing of motion to
transfer). The interrelationship between the consent and motion to transfer procedures in
the statute is unclear. Under the statute, a transfer of venue apparently is available only
upon the timely filing of a proper motion before any other responsive pleading; yet the same
rovision states that a written consent to transfer may be filed at any time. See Article 1995,
4(c).
128. TEX. R. Civ. P. 94. Rule 94 provides, in part, that:
[A] party shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and
award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy,
duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow ser-
vant, laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of
limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirma-
tive defense.
Id. (emphasis added).
129. 648 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. 1983).
130. Id. at 285; accord Bocanegra v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 605 S.W.2d 848, 850 (Tex.
1980); Mid-Tex Constr. Corp. v. Passero, 430 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Vratis v. Baxter, 315 S.W.2d 331, 340 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
131. 658 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
132. Id. at 667; accord Brown v. American Transfer & Storage Co., 601 S.W.2d 931, 936
(Tex. 1980).
133. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
134. 660 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ).
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relief sought" in order to support a default judgment, 35 the court of ap-
peals held that general and conclusory allegations that simply tracked the
DTPA's statutory language were insufficient.136 Specifically, the appellate
court found that the plaintiffs allegations did not designate with particu-
larity which acts or events the plaintiff relied upon as a basis for liability
under the DTPA and did not specify the acts that were the producing
cause of injury to the plaintiff. 137
VII. LIMITATIONS
During the survey period Texas courts examined a host of statutes pro-
viding specific limitations periods for professional malpractice actions.
Plaintiffs suing doctors or hospitals received a disproportionate share of
the courts' largesse, prevailing in each of the four limitations cases that
attracted the attention of the Texas Supreme Court. Two of these cases
involved former article 5.82 of the Texas Insurance Code, which provided
a two-year limitation period for filing malpractice suits against physicians
or hospitals carrying liability insurance. 138  In Sax v. Votteler 139 the
supreme court held that application of article 5.82 to minors over the age
of six was unconstitutional as a violation of the open courts provision of
the Texas Constitution.140 The plaintiffs in Sax, the parents of an eleven-
year-old who was allegedly the victim of a doctor's negligence, argued that
the statute, which barred their claim filed three years after the date of the
child's operation, violated the equal protection and due process guarantees
of the United States and Texas Constitutions. The plaintiffs premised their
argument on the fact that article 5.82 treated medical malpractice minor
claimants differently from minor claimants in other tort actions. They ar-
gued also that the limitations period was manifestly so short that it de-
prived an injured plaintiff of a reasonable opportunity to enforce his or her
claim. Observing that the statute had survived past challenges to its consti-
tutionality, 141 the court of appeals rejected the parents' arguments and af-
135. Id. at 559; accord Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d 679, 683 (Tex. 1979); C & H
Transp. Co. v. Wright, 396 S.W.2d 443, 446 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
136. The plaintiff made the following DTPA allegations:
[P]laintiff is a consumer and in the course of this transaction, defendants en-
gaged in false, misleading, and deceptive acts or practices in trade or com-
merce; further . . . the course of conduct is further in violation of sections
17.46 and 17.50 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code, in that defend-
ants have failed to comply with express and/or implied warranties, and have
been guilty of unconscionable actions or courses of action and plaintiff is
thereby entitled to relief, in addition to their actual damages, treble damages
and reasonable attorneys' fees . ...
660 S.W.2d at 558.
137. Id. at 560.
138. Act of June 3, 1975, ch. 330, § 4, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 864, 865, repealed by Act of
June 16, 1977 ch. 817, § 41.03, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 2039, 2064. Article 5.82 imposed a two-
year statute of limitations on all persons regardless of minority except that minors under six
years of age had until their eighth birthday to file.
139. 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983).
140. TEx. CONST. art. I, § 13.
141. See, e.g., Littlefield v. Hayes, 609 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980,
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firmed a summary judgment in favor of the doctor. 142
The supreme court, however, chose to bypass considerations of equal
protection, as well as due process under the United States Constitution,
and focused instead on the open courts provision. The court labeled this
provision a "due process guarantee" that accords Texas citizens rights ad-
ditional to those guaranteed by the United States Constitution. 43 Accord-
ing to the court, a statute or ordinance that "unreasonably abridges a
justiciable right to obtain redress for injuries caused by the wrongful acts
of another amounts to a denial of due process under article I, section 13,
and is, therefore, void."' 44 After first determining that a child does in fact
have a well-defined justiciable right to sue for injuries negligently inflicted
by others,145 the court concluded that the statute abrogated that right alto-
gether, without providing a reasonable alternative. The court reached this
conclusion because the statute barred assertion of the minor's cause of ac-
tion once he reached the age of majority, if more than two years had ex-
pired since the date of injury, even though the minor had no right to bring
his action beforehand. 146 Consequently, although the court acknowledged
the salutory purpose of article 5.82 to secure an insurance rate structure
that would enable health care providers to obtain liability insurance, it
concluded that the means the legislature chose for achieving that purpose
was illegitimate.' 47 As a result, the court remanded the case to the district
court for trial of the claims belonging to the minor.' 48
no writ); Wallace v. Homan & Crimen, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 322, 323-24 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
142. 636 S.W.2d 461, 463-65 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1982).
143. 648 S.W.2d at 664. Although the court of appeals concluded that art. I, § 13 of the
Texas Constitution "was not raised as a ground of defense to the motion for summary judg-
ment and cannot be considered," it nevertheless noted in a dictum that art. 5.82 did not
violate the open courts provision. 636 S.W.2d at 465. The supreme court disagreed, holding
that the petitioner's response to the motion for summary judgment, which included an alle-
ation that the statute denied due process, was sufficient to preserve the matter for review.
48 S.W.2d at 664.
144. Id. at 665 (citing Hanks v. City of Port Arthur, 121 Tex. 202, 206, 48 S.W.2d 944,
945 (1932)).
145. According to the court, the minor has a cause of action to recover for pain and
suffering and loss of earning capacity after the age of majority, which cause of action is
distinctly separate from the parents' right to recover for medical costs the parents have in-
curred on behalf of the minor and diminution of the child's earning capacity during the
remaining period of his minority. 648 S.W.2d at 666.
146. Id. at 667. In other words, a minor could not bring an action in his own right until
he attained the age of majority, but if he sustained the injury before his sixteenth birthday
art. 5.82 would bar the action.
147. Id. The careful practitioner should note that the basis upon which the supreme
court declared art. 5.82 unconstitutional applies equally to its successor statute, TEX. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 1984), which likewise provides for a two-
year statute of limitations, but which is tolled during the first twelve years of a minor's life.
Not being in the habit of rendering advisory opinions, however, the supreme court failed to
mention this fact in its opinion.
148. The court affirmed the summary judgment, however, with respect to the causes of
action in favor of the minor's parents, since the statute of limitations had run with respect to
their claims and the statute, as applied to them, did not run afoul of the open courts provi-
sion of the Texas Constitution. 648 S.W.2d at 667.
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The question in Delgado v. Burns149 was whether the discovery rule' 50
applied to medical malpractice actions formerly governed by article 5.82
and its two-year statute of limitations. The plaintiff filed suit against a
surgeon, seeking recovery for injuries resulting from the doctor's failure to
remove surgical staples during an operation on October 9, 1975. Post-op-
erative treatment continued until December of that year, but the plaintiff
did not subsequently see her doctor until February 1978, when one of the
staples was removed. Approximately two months later the plaintiff filed
her action. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the
doctor based on his plea of limitations. On appeal, the court of appeals
dispensed with the plaintiffs constitutional attack on article 5.82, conclud-
ing that the plaintiffs response to the motion for summary judgment had
not preserved the issue of the statute's constitutionality.'5 ' Addressing the
plaintiff's argument that the discovery rule applied and tolled commence-
ment of the limitations period until February 3, 1978, when the plaintiff
first learned of the existence of the surgical staples, the court of appeals
held that the discovery rule did not apply, under former article 5.82, to
actions against physicians carrying medical liability insurance. 52 Accord-
ing to the court, the judiciary engrafted the discovery rule onto article
5526,153 which governed medical malpractice actions prior to June 3, 1975,
to determine when certain causes of action accrued within the meaning of
the statute.' 54 In passing article 5.82, however, the legislature abrogated
this judicial gloss by deleting reference in the new statutory language to
when the cause of action accrues. 155 Accordingly, the court held that the
discovery rule was inapplicable and affirmed the judgment of the trial
cotr t. 1
5 6
149. 650 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]), rev'd, 656 S.W.2d 428 (Tex.
1983).
150. The discovery rule provides that the statute of limitations does not start to run until
the plaintiff discovers the true facts giving rise to his claimed damage or until the date dis-
covery should reasonably have been made. See Hayes v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Tex.
1972); Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577, 578 (Tex. 1967). See generaly Figari, Graves &
Dwyer, supra note 32, at 300-01 (discussing discovery rule).
151. 650 S.W.2d at 506-07.
152. Id. at 507; see also Littlefield v. Hays, 609 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1980, no writ) (fact that discovery rule was abolished by statute as to insured, but
not uninsured, doctors does not render it invalid). By its own terms, art. 5.82 applied only to
"claim[s] against a person or hospital covered by a policy of professional liability insurance
covering a person licensed to practice medicine or podiatry or certified to administer anes-
thesia . . . . Act of June 3, 1975, ch. 330, § 4, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 864, 865 (repealed
1977).
153. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5526, § 6 (Vernon Supp. 1984) provides that all
actions for injury to the person of another shall be commenced and prosecuted within two
years after the cause of action accrues.
154. 650 S.W.2d at 506-07; see Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577, 580-81 (Tex. 1967)
(quoting Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277, 285-86 (1961) (discussing when
cause of action accrues)).
155. 650 S.W.2d at 507.
156. The supreme court, however, reversed the judgment of the court of appeals in Del-
gado on other grounds and remanded the case to the district court for trial. Ignoring the
issue of the discovery rule, the court simply held that the summary judgment record failed to
establish the plaintiff's last treatment date, which was the commencement date for the limi-
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Bordelon v. Peck 157 involved the limitations provision of article 4590i,
the successor to former article 5.82 of the Insurance Code. 158 After first
acknowledging that one court had already held the discovery rule inappli-
cable under the new health care statute,' 59 the court of appeals in Bordelon
concluded that the legislature had also eliminated the court-developed
doctrine of fraudulent concealment 160 as an exception to the statute of lim-
itations governing malpractice actions.161 According to the court, section
10.01 of article 4590i establishes an absolute time in which suits must be
filed; the legislature adopted the termination rule so that all suits would be
filed within two years of the date the medical or health care treatment was
completed.162 A sharply divided supreme court disagreed and reversed the
judgment of the court of appeals.' 63 The supreme court observed that a
fiduciary relationship exists between physician and patient and, therefore,
a physician has a duty to disclose a negligent act or the fact that an injury
has occurred. 164 Failure to disclose in such instances amounts to fraudu-
lent concealment, which operates to "prevent the wrongdoer from perpe-
trating further fraud by using limitations as a shield."' 165 Thus, without
even addressing the court of appeals' statutory analysis, the supreme court
held that article 4590i, section 10.01, does not abolish fraudulent conceal-
ment as an equitable estoppel to the defense of limitations under the
statute. 166
tations period under former art. 5.82 of the Insurance Code. Delgado v. Burns, 656 S.W.2d
428, 429 (Tex. 1983); see Act of June 3, 1975, ch. 330, § 4, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 864, 865
(repealed 1977) (no claim may be commenced unless action filed within two years from date
medical treatment completed).
157. 643 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1982), rev'd, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 494 (July 6,
1983).
158. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 1984) essentially
recodifies art. 5.82. See supra note 147.
159. See Littlefield v. Hays, 609 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no
writ).
160. Under the fraudulent concealment doctrine, where a defendant is under a duty to
make disclosure but fraudulently conceals the existence of a cause of action from a party to
whom it belongs, the defendant is estopped from relying on the defense of limitations until
the party learns of the right of action or should have learned thereof through the exercise of
reasonable diligence. Estate of Stonecipher v. Estate of Butts, 591 S.W.2d 806, 809 (Tex.
1979); Nicholas v. Smith, 507 S.W.2d 518, 519 (Tex. 1974).
161. 643 S.W.2d at 235.
162. Id. In reaching its conclusion the court of appeals relied on the legislative history of
art. 4590i as described by one of the commentators. See Witherspoon, Constitutionality of
the Texas Statute Limiting Liabilityfor Medical Malpractice, 10 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 419, 425
(1979), cited in Bordelon, 643 S.W.2d at 235.
163. 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 494 (July 6, 1983) (5-4 decision).
164. Id. at 495 (citing Nichols v. Smith, 507 S.W.2d 518, 519 (Tex. 1974); Fitzpatrick v.
Marlowe, 553 S.W.2d 190, 194 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ refd n.r.e.)).
165. 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 495.
166. Id. The dissenters engaged in a statutory analysis akin to that of the lower court
and concluded by accusing the majority of circumventing the legislature's intent. Id. at 496
(Barrow, J., dissenting). Further, the dissent observed that the fraudulent concealment ex-
ception would not warrant reversal at any rate since the fiduciary relationship between the
plaintiff and defendant and, hence, the duty to disclose, ended more than two years before
the plaintiff filed suit. Id. (citing McClung v. Johnson, 620 S.W.2d 644, 647 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1981, writ refd n.r.e.), discussedin Figari, Graves & Dwyer, supra note 100, at
450). Moreover, the estoppel effect of fraudulent concealment ends when a party learns the
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Article 4590i was also the subject of discussion in Schepps v. Presbyterian
Hospital.167 In Schepps the supreme court agreed with both of the lower
courts and held that the sixty-day notice provision of the statute was
mandatory. 168 The courts had differing opinions, however, about the de-
fendants' remedy for the plaintiffs noncompliance with the notice require-
ment. In Schepps the plaintiff filed suit against a hospital and doctor
without first providing the requisite notice. After the two-year statute of
limitations had expired, the defendants moved for summary judgment and
the trial court granted a take-nothing judgment against the plaintiff.
Agreeing with the trial court that the notice provision was mandatory, the
court of appeals reversed the judgment and remanded it to the trial court
with instructions to dismiss the plaintiffs case.169 The supreme court
adopted a more sympathetic view of the plaintiffs plight, however, deter-
mining that the appropriate remedy when a plaintiff fails to give notice is
for the trial court to abate the action for sixty days. 170 According to the
court, barring prosecution of the plaintiffs claim would unduly restrict his
rights, contrary to the statutory intent.'
7
'
In addition to cases involving medical malpractice, the courts handed
down several decisions concerning limitations in other professional mal-
practice areas. In Skeen v. Monsanto Co. ,172 for example, a federal court
construed article 5536a,173 the statute of limitations governing malpractice
claims against engineers and architects. The plaintiffs contended that the
statute was inapplicable to persons who merely designed improvements, as
opposed to those who actually performed construction or repairs. The
court rejected this argument and held that the statute barred the plaintiffs
action against a defendant designer that was brought more than twenty
years after the project was substantially completed. 74 Moreover, since the
true facts, and it was undisputed that the plaintiff was put on notice of the negligent act more
than two years prior to filing suit. 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 497.
167. 652 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. 1983).
168. Id. at 938. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 4.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1984)
provides: "Any person or his authorized agent asserting a health care liability claim shall
give written notice of such claim ...to each physician or health care provider against
whom such claim is being made at least 60 days before the filing of a suit ....
169. 638 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982), rev'd, 652 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. 1983).
170. 652 S.W.2d at 938. The court disapproved of the contrary holding in Wilborn v.
University Hosp., 642 S.W.2d 50, 52-53 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1982, no writ).
171. 652 S.W.2d at 938; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 1.02(b), (b)(3)
(Vernon Supp. 1984). In his dissent Chief Justice Pope disagreed, stating that the remedy of
abatement frustrates the statute's purpose of clearing court dockets for meritorious cases.
625 S.W.2d at 939.
172. 569 F. Supp. 232 (S.D. Tex. 1983).
173. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5536a(l) (Vernon Supp. 1984) provides, in part, that
all causes of action for personal injury, death, and property damage, arising out of a defec-
tive or unsafe condition of any improvement to real property, against any registered or li-
censed architect performing or furnishing the design, planning, or inspection of construction
must be commenced and prosecuted within 10 years after the substantial completion of the
improvement.
174. 569 F. Supp. at 234. The court noted that persons who design improvements to real
property are clearly within the statute's purview, even though the title of the statute fails to
mention them specifically. Id. at 233.
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defendant was merely a designer and did not actually furnish construction
or repairs to the improvement, fraudulant concealment was unavailable as
a defense to the limitations statute. 75 Finally, the court upheld the stat-
ute's validity in the face of the plaintiffs attack on its constitutionality. 76
Jimenez v. Maloney 177 reaffirmed the view, espoused two years earlier in
McClung v. Johnson ,178 that the discovery rule does not apply in actions
for legal malpractice. The court of appeals in Jimenez also considered the
effect of article 5535,179 which tolls the statute of limitations for persons
imprisoned, on a prisoner who is on parole. Noting that a determination
of whether a party is imprisoned within the meaning of the statute depends
on the nature and degree of the restraint imposed,' 80 the court concluded
that the prisoner's parole conditions did not inhibit his access to the courts
and, therefore, parole was not imprisonment under article 5535.181 The
court also held, in line with the prevailing authorities, that the applicable
limitations period commences to run once a prisoner's disability is re-
moved, and it is not subsequently tolled by reimprisonment.182
Finally, the legislature amended section 13.01 of the Texas Family
Code, the statute of limitations governing paternity suits., 83 Section 13.01
175. Id. at 234. Section 1 of the statute concerns designers. Unlike § 2, which involves
persons actually furnishing construction or repairs, § I offers no exception to the 10-year
limitation period for fraudulent concealment. Compare TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
5536a(I) (Vernon Supp. 1984); with id. art. 5536a(2).
176. 569 F. Supp. at 234; see Ellerbe v. Otis Elevator Co., 618 S.W.2d 870, 873 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (upholding constitutionality of art. 5536a),
appeal dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 24, 74 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1982), discussed in Figari, Graves & Dwyer,
supra note 100, at 452.
177. 646 S.W.2d 673, 674 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ dism'd).
178. 620 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.), discussed in Figari,
Graves & Dwyer, supra note 100, at 450. McClung held that the applicable statute of limita-
tions in legal malpractice actions commenced to run once the attorney-client relationship
ended. 620 S.W.2d at 647.
179. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5535 (Vernon Supp. 1984) provides:
If a person entitled to bring any action mentioned in this subdivision of this
title be at the time the cause of action accrues . . . a person imprisoned...
the time of such disability shall not be deemed a portion of the time limited
for the commencement of the action and such person shall have the same time
after the removal of his disability that is allowed to others by the provisions of
this title.
180. See Adler v. Beverly Hills Hosp., 594 S.W.2d 153, 158 (Tex. Civ. App-Dallas
1980, no writ) (disability includes practical as well as legal disability to sue); Carter v. Asso-
ciated Transfer & Storage Co., 410 S.W.2d 830, 832-33 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1966, no
writ) (imprisonment is determined by the nature and degree of restraint imposed).
181. 646 S.W.2d at 674-75.
182. Id. at 675; see Stephens v. Curtis, 450 F. Supp. 141, 144 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Blum v.
Elkins, 369 S.W.2d 810, 812-13 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1963, no writ).
183. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 744, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 4530 (codified at TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 13.01 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983)). The legislature's action was no doubt
prompted by decisions of the United States and Texas Supreme Courts in 1982 that declared
unconstitutional the former one-year statute of limitations for paternity suits in Texas. See
Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 101 (1982), and In re J.A.M., 631 S.W.2d 730, 731-32 (Tex.
1982), discussed in Figari, Graves & Dwyer, supra note 32, at 303-04. Although the legisla-
ture had already amended § 13.01 of the Texas Family Code prior to those decisions, the
amended version provided only a four-year limitations period and, thus, probably incorpo-
rated the same constitutional flaws that inhered in its predecessor. See TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 13.01 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (repealed).
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now provides that a paternity suit may be brought on or before the second
anniversary of the day the child becomes an adult. 184 Significantly, the
new statute is retroactive in its application, restoring causes of action that
had already become barred under the old statute. 85
VIII. PARTIES
Rule 42(c)(1) requires the proponent of a class action to plead the ele-
ments of a class action stated in subdivisions (a) and (b) of the rule and to
prove those elements at a hearing set as soon as practicable after the peti-
tion is filed.' 8 6 Mahoney v. Cupp 187 emphasized the importance of provid-
ing the opposing party with due notice of that class certification hearing. 188
The plaintiffs filed suit under the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer
Protection Act, 189 pleading for appropriate orders and rulings under rule
42 to maintain the suit as a class action. The plaintiffs also sought tempo-
rary injunctive relief, which the court granted following a hearing that the
defendant did not attend. The court entered no order, however, regarding
certification of the class, and the plaintiffs, therefore, subsequently moved
for such an order. The court entered the certification order following a
second hearing, at which the defendant was present. No evidence was ad-
duced at the second hearing, however, apart from a transcript of the testi-
mony from the first hearing, which the plaintiff introduced without
objection by the defendant.
On appeal, the defendant complained that the order granting class certi-
fication was erroneous because it was based upon a hearing held without
notice to him.190 Rejecting this contention, the court of appeals held that
the defendant had received proper notice of the second hearing and had
had an opportunity to be heard. 19' Nevertheless, the court reversed the
order of certification because it was unsupported by the evidence. In this
connection, the court concluded that the order could not be based on the
testimony adduced at the first hearing, since the defendant did not receive
proper notice that the first hearing would address the question of class
184. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.01 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983).
185. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 744, § 2, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 4530, A531.
186. TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(c)(1); see Duncan v. Dripping Springs Indep. School Dist., 612
S.W.2d 644, 647 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1981, no writ).
187. 638 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. App.-Waco 1982, no writ).
188. The court noted that fundamental due process under both the Texas and the United
States Constitutions required that the defendant have notice and an opportunity to be heard
on the question of class certification since certification would broadly affect his property
rights. Id. at 260.
189. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN., §§ 17.41-.60 (Vernon Supp. 1984) [hereinafter cited
as DTPA].
190. 638 S.W.2d at 260. The defendant apparently contended on appeal that the class
certification order actually stemmed from the first hearing since no new evidence was ad-
duced at the second hearing. Moreover, the record at the first hearing did not show any
notice to or knowledge by the defendant that the class certification question would be ad-
dressed at that hearing. Id. at 259-60.
191. Id. at 261.
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certification. 92 Moreover, the transcript of that testimony was hearsay at
the second hearing, since the plaintiff had established no predicate show-
ing that the witness at the first hearing was unavailable at the second hear-
ing, and the defendant had not been afforded the opportunity to cross-
examine.' 93 Accordingly, the hearsay evidence could not support the or-
der entered after the second hearing, 94 and the case was remanded for a
new trial on the issue of class certification.195
The court in Mahoney also held that the DTPA does not preclude class
actions as a matter of law. 196 According to the court, the Texas Legislature
repealed the DTPA provisions that formerly authorized class actions 97 in
order to avoid their possible interference with the application of rule 42;
however, the legislature did not intend to exclude class actions as a proce-
dural device under the act.198 Moreover, the court envisioned no problem
in administering a class composed of members who would be subject to
different versions of the DTPA as a result of amendments to the statute.
Under rule 42(d), the trial court could simply divide the class into appro-
priate subclasses and treat each subclass separately. 99
Although rule 39200 now contemplates that indispensable parties are
rather rare,201 Neely v. Schooler202 is a warning that the doctrine of indis-
pensable parties is not dead. The plaintiffs in Neely sued for specific per-
192. Id. at 260. According to the court, the only exception to this notice requirement
arises when the defendant has defaulted on the question of class certification by failing to
file a timely answer to the suit. No evidence existed in this case, however, showing any
default by the defendant. Id.
193. Id. at 261 (citing Houston Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brittian, 402 S.W.2d 509, 510
(Tex. 1966); Lone Star Gas Co. v. State, 137 Tex. 279, 308, 153 S.W.2d 681, 697 (1941)).
194. The court adhered to the long-standing Texas doctrine that inadmissible hearsay,
admitted because of a failure to object, was of no probative value and could not in any way
support a judgment. 638 S.W.2d at 261; see Cooper Petroleum Co. v. LaGloria Oil & Gas
Co., 436 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex. 1969); Texas Co. v. Lee, 138 Tex. 167, 171, 157 S.W.2d 628,
631 (1941). Of course, that doctrine is no longer the rule in Texas. See TEX. R. EVID. 802.
195. 638 S.W.2d at 261. The court chose to remand the case in the interest of justice,
rather than render judgment for the defendant, since the plaintiffs' failure to produce new
evidence at the second hearing apparently resulted from their mistaken belief that the evi-
dence from the first hearing was admissible. Id. at 261. This approach is expressly author-
ized for the Texas Supreme Court and, by analogy, should similarly apply to the courts of
appeal. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 505; Aetna Ins. Co. v. Klein, 160 Tex. 61, 67, 325 S.W.2d 376,
379-80 (1959).
196. 638 S.W.2d at 261.
197. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.51-.54 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983), repealed by
Act of May 23, 1977, ch. 216, §§ 10-13, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 605.
198. 638 S.W.2d at 261. The supreme court approved the present version of rule 42 on
May 9, 1977. According to the court, the adoption of this rule rendered unnecessary the
former class action provisions of the DTPA. Id.; see generally Dorsaneo, Creditor's Rights,
32 Sw. L.J. 245, 268 (1978) (discussion of rule 42); Pope & McConnico, Texas Civil Proce-
dure Rule Making, 30 BAYLOR L REV. 5, 15 (1978) (discussion of rule 42).
199. 638 S.W.2d at 261-62; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(d). Moreover, under rule 42(c) the
court can alter, amend, or withdraw a class at any time before judgment. TEX. R. Civ. P.
42(c).
200. Id. 39.
201. See Pirtle v. Gregory, 629 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. 1982) (per curiam), discussed in Figari,
Graves & Dwyer, supra note 32, at 306; Cooper v. Texas Gulf Indus., Inc., 513 S.W.2d 200,
204 (Tex. 1974).
202. 643 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
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formance of a contract relating to real property. They failed, however, to
join as a party defendant a third party to whom the named defendant had
deeded the property. Affirming an instructed verdict in favor of the de-
fendant, the court of appeals concluded that the absent party, who was the
record owner of the land, was indispensable. 20 3 Pointing out that the
plaintiffs knew the names of the persons who had not been joined,2°4 the
court cited what it termed as the longstanding rule in Texas that "the par-
ties to [a] contract will be the parties to an action for its specific enforce-
ment, and all who have an interest in the contract . . . or whose interests
may be affected are indispensable parties. 20 5
Jones v. Springs Ranch Co. 206 involved the procedure for determining
the validity of an intervention under rule 60.207 Although the plaintiff
filed a motion to strike the petition of two intervening defendants, she
never obtained a ruling from the trial court on her motion. Accordingly,
the court of appeals held that an issue regarding the validity of the inter-
vention was not preserved for appeal and refused to reach the merits of the
point.208 Citing a procedurally similar case in support,20 9 the court ob-
served that an intervenor under rule 60 is not required to obtain the trial
court's approval in order to intervene; the burden is on the opposing party
to secure an order striking the petition in intervention.210 Since the plain-
tiff did not pursue the matter in the trial court, she was precluded from
litigating the issue for the first time on appeal.
Finally, in Threeway Constructors, Inc. v. Aten,2 I the court found no
abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of a defendant's motion for
leave to join a third party. By requiring that a defendant ask leave of court
to file a third-party petition, rule 38 reposes discretion in the trial court to
grant or deny the request. 212 According to the court of appeals, the trial
court did not abuse this discretion since the motion was filed more than a
year after the suit was filed and less than three months before trial.213
203. Id. at 231.
204. Id. TEX. R. Civ. P. 39(c) provides that a plaintiff knowing the names of necessary
parties must plead the reasons for their nonjoinder. Apparently, the court deemed it of some
significance, in reaching its determination that the absent parties were indispensable, that
the plaintiffs had failed to comply with the provisions of rule 39(c).
205. 643 S.W.2d at 231 (quoting I R. McDONALD, supra note 62, § 3.28.4).
206. 642 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1982, no writ).
207. TEX. R. Civ. P. 60.
208. 642 S.W.2d at 554.
209. Bell v. Craig, 555 S.W.2d 210, 212 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ).
210. 642 S.W.2d at 554; see also McWilliams v. Snap-Pac Corp., 476 S.W.2d 941, 949-50
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (allowed intervention according
to rule 60 because no motion to strike offered).
211. No. 08-82-00335-CV (Tex. App.-El Paso, Aug. 17, 1983, no writ).
212. Id., TEX. R. Civ. P. 38.
213. No. 08-82-00335-CV (Tex. App.-El Paso, Aug. 17, 1983, no writ); see TEX. R. Civ.
P. 37 (prohibits the addition of new parties at a time when it will unreasonably delay the
trial).
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IX. DISCOVERY
On November 23, 1982, the Texas Supreme Court officially promulgated
the Texas Rules of Evidence, which became effective on September 1,
1983, and now govern all civil proceedings. 214  Article V of those rules
recognizes certain evidentiary privileges with respect to reports privileged
by statute;215 attorney-client communications; 216 husband-wife communi-
cations; 217 communications to clergymen;218 political votes;219 trade
secrets; 220 identify of informers;221 physician-patient communications;
222
and mental health information. 223 The new rules of evidence also re-
pealed the accountant-client privilege, which was formerly authorized by
statute. 224 Although each of these privileges obviously impacts on discov-
ery, 225 a full discussion of the privileges, as well as other aspects of the new
rules of evidence, is beyond the scope of this Article and is treated else-
where in this Survey.226
During the survey period the Texas Legislature also created a limited
privilege of significance to bank practitioners. Amended article 342-705
of the Texas Banking Code, 227 effective September 1, 1983, restricts access
to a bank's records in several respects. The statute provides that no bank
shall be required to disclose or produce to third parties, or permit third
parties to examine, any records of accounts or other bank records except in
circumstances falling within one of four exceptions enumerated in the stat-
ute.228 The statute also authorizes the affected bank customer to petition
214. Order Adopting the Texas Rules of Evidence (Tex. Sup. Ct., Nov. 23, 1982) (unpub-
lished interim order).









224. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 41a-1, § 26 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983)
(deemed repealed as to civil actions as of Sept. 1, 1983). Rule 503, however, which codifies
the attorney-client privilege, includes in the definition of "representative of the lawyer" an
accountant "who is reasonably necessary for the lawyer's rendition of professional legal
services." TEX. R. EvID. 503(a)(4). Of course, this provision is much more limited than the
former statutory privilege for communications to accountants.
225. Article V of the Rules of Evidence, however, does not necessarily expand the
number or scope of privileges formerly recognized under Texas law. Indeed, the consensus
among commentators is that the rules have created no new privileges, nor have any previ-
ously existing privileges been expanded. See Goode & Sharlot, Article V Privileges, 20
Hous. L. REV. 273 (1983) (Tex. R. Evid. Handbook).
226. See Addison, Evidence, supra p. 371, at 385-87.
227. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 525, § 2, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 3056, 3057-59 (codified at
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-705 (Vernon Supp. 1984)).
228. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 342-705, § I (Vernon Supp. 1984). The four ex-
ceptions are:
(i) where the depositor or owner of such deposit or other bank customer as to
whom records of accounts or other bank records are to be disclosed is a proper
or necessary party to a proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction. . . or
(ii) where the bank itself is a proper or necessary party. . . or (iii) in response
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the appropriate court to prohibit discovery of bank records even if the or-
der, subpoena, or request for discovery falls within one of the four speci-
fied exceptions. 229 Moreover, the bank is not required to make any
disclosure unless the party requesting discovery has properly provided no-
tice of the subpoena, order, or request to the bank customer, and certified
to the bank that the requisite notice has been delivered.230
Questions of privilege were also addressed by a Texas court of appeals
in a pair of cases that arose from a double murder committed in Hawaii.
In Warford v. Childers231 the Amarillo court of appeals upheld the trial
court's refusal to order a deponent police officer to divulge the identity of a
confidential informant who had given him information about the mur-
der.232 The court noted that the existence of a privilege protecting the
names of confidential informants is a well-settled principle in criminal
cases233 and concluded that the same principle should apply in civil
cases. 234 Having determined that none of the commonly recognized ex-
ceptions to invocation of the privilege existed in the case, it affirmed the
decision of the trial court. 235 In Warford v. Beard236 discovery in Texas by
the plaintiffs in the same Hawaii litigation was thwarted by the assertion of
a different privilege. The deponents in Beard, claiming a fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, 237 refused to answer most of the ques-
tions asked of them or to produce subpoenaed documents. Once again the
trial court denied the plaintiffs' rule 215a 238 motion to require the depo-
nents to respond to the discovery requests. The court of appeals reversed
to a subpoena issued by a legislative investigating committee of the Legisla-
ture of Texas, or (iv) in response to a request for examination of its records by
the Attorney General of Texas pursuant to Article 1302-5.01 et seq. of the
Texas Miscellaneous Corporation Laws Act.
Id. The statute provides additional limited exceptions for disclosures made in substantial
compliance with federal law or in the regular course of business. Id.
229. Id. § 3. The bank customer's petition must be verified and served on both the bank
and the party seeking discovery prior to the date specified for the bank's disclosure. Id.
230. Id. § 2. The requesting party must give notice to the depositor or customer by per-
sonal service or certified mail, return receipt requested, at least 10 days before he seeks
compliance with the discovery request. Id.
231. 642 S.W.2d 63 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1982, no writ).
232. Id. at 68. Since the primary litigation was pending in Hawaii, and the deposition
was taken pursuant to a commission in accordance with TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
3769a (Vernon Supp. 1984), the discovering party sought only rule 215a relief in the Texas
court. Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded it had jurisdiction of the appeal although
rulings on pre-trial discovery motions usually cannot be challenged until a final judgment
has been entered in the case. The court reasoned that since this was a final judgment of all
issues in controversy in Texas, the appeal was not interlocutory in nature. 642 S.W.2d at 66.
Of course, in the more traditional situation where the court in which the primary litigation is
pending denies discovery, the aggrieved party may seek mandamus relief. See Pope v. Fer-
guson, 445 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 997 (1970).
233. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. State, 614 S.W.2d 448, 449 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); Etchieson
v. State, 574 S.W.2d 753, 757 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Carmouche v. State, 540 S.W.2d 701,
703 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
234. 642 S.W.2d at 66-67.
235. Id. at 67. The privilege and its exceptions now appear in TEX. R. EVID. 508.
236. 653 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983, no writ).
237. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
238. TEX. R. Civ. P. 2 15a.
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that decision, however, observing that "the civil witness, unlike the defend-
ant in a criminal case, is not the exclusive arbiter of his right to exercise the
privilege. ' '239 According to the court, the trial judge must determine the
validity of the claim of privilege. 240 Because many of the unanswered
questions did not, on their face, call for incriminating answers and the
record in the trial court failed to illustrate the hazard to the deponents in
responding to the questions, the court of appeals held that the deponents
had failed to justify their claim of privilege. 241
The Beard court found the privileged document issue more complex be-
cause documents, even if incriminating, may not be testimonial in nature,
and "'the fifth amendment does not protect against compulsion of nontes-
timonial acts. .... , ",242 Consequently, the court reasoned that the docu-
ments must have a strong personal connection to the witness in order to be
privileged. 243 Judging by this standard the court found certain categories
of requested documents clearly nonprivileged. 244 The court left determi-
nation of the validity of the privilege with respect to the remaining unpro-
duced documents, as well as the unanswered deposition questions, to the
trial court to determine upon remand. Finally, the court of appeals held
that the trial court could conduct its hearing to determine the validity of
each claim of privilege either in open court or in camera at its
discretion. 245
Katin v. City of Lubbock 246 also involved an asserted fifth amendment
privilege. Here, however, the defendant claimed the privilege as a basis
for refusing either to admit or deny certain facts requested to be admitted
pursuant to rule 169.247 The defendant argued that the assertion of the
privilege applied since the suit sought to enjoin his alleged zoning viola-
tions, and violations of a zoning ordinance were punishable by criminal
sanctions. The court of appeals disagreed, noting that the suit involved
only civil remedies and that rule 169 precludes the use of requested admis-
sions in any other proceeding. 248 Because the admissions could not be
used against the defendant in a subsequent criminal proceeding, the court
held the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination was unavail-
able as a justification for refusing to respond to the plaintiffs request.249
239. 653 S.W.2d at 911 (citing Exparte Butler, 522 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. 1975)).
240. 653 S.W.2d at 911.
241. Id. at 912.
242. Id. (quoting United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1042 (5th Cir. 1981)).
243. 653 S.W.2d at 912. Indeed, the court stated that the witness must have written the
documents himself or they must have been written under his immediate supervision. Id; see
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 396 (1976); 1 R. RAY, TEXAS PRACTICE, LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 471, at 454 (3d ed. 1980).
244. 653 S.W.2d at 912.
245. Id. at 913.
246. 655 S.W.2d 360 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
247. TEX. R. Civ. P. 169.
248. 655 S.W.2d at 363. TEX. R. Civ. P. 169 provides that "[a]ny admission made by a
party under this rule is for the purpose of the pending action only and neither constitutes an
admission by him for any other purpose nor may be used against him in any other
proceeding."
249. 655 S.W.2d at 363.
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Discovery sanctions were also a topic of judicial commentary during the
survey period. In Nutting v. National Homes Manufacturing Co. 250 the
court considered the propriety of entering a default judgment against two
defendants as a sanction for their failure to answer interrogatories after the
trial court had ordered them to do so. Stating that the record reflected a
conscious indifference on defendants' part regarding the requirements of
the discovery rules and the trial court's order, the court of appeals held
that imposition of the default sanction was not an abuse of discretion. 251
Nevertheless, because the plaintiffs claims were unliquidated and the
amount of the award was unsupported by any evidence, the court of ap-
peals reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case for
further proceedings.252
The Texas Supreme Court discussed a different type of discovery sanc-
tion in Smithson v. Cessna Aircraft Co. 253 The problem arose when in
mid-trial the plaintiff tendered the testimony of an expert witness whom
the plaintiff had not previously identified in response to the defendant's
pretrial interrogatories. The trial court postponed the expert's testimony
over the weekend to allow the defendant to depose him. When the trial
resumed, the court allowed the plaintiff to read portions of the expert's
deposition into evidence over the defendant's objection. The court of ap-
peals, however, held that the district court's admission of the expert's testi-
mony constituted an abuse of discretion.254 Observing that the amended
version of rule 168 required exclusion of the expert's testimony, 255 the
court elected to follow recent Texas decisions256 that recognized exclusion
250. 639 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. App.-Austin 1982, no writ).
251. Id. at 723. TEX. R. Civ. P. 170(c) and 215a permit the court to render a default
judgment against a party refusing to obey certain orders of discovery. Rule 168 expressly
permits the court to invoke the sanctions of rules 170 and 215a for a party resisting discovery
by interrogatories. Id. 168; see Bass v. Duffey, 620 S.W.2d 847, 849 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ). See generally Figari, Graves & Dwyer, supra note 32, at 307-
09 (discussing discovery sanctions).
252. 639 S.W.2d at 724. Whether the court considered the judgment defective only with
respect to the damage award is not entirely clear. In its comparison of post-answer defaults
with other types of default judgments, the court inferred that entry of a post-answer default
judgment as in this case does not relieve the plaintiff of his obligation to offer evidence and
prove his case, even with respect to liability. The requirement of proof, however, tends to
minimize the effectiveness of the sanction. Other courts have adopted a better approach and
have reversed only the portion of the judgment specifying the amount of damages. See, e.g.,
Pearson Corp. v. Wichita Falls Boys Club Alunmi Ass'n, 633 S.W.2d 684, 687 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 1982, no writ); Bass v. Duffey, 620 S.W.2d 847, 849-50 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
253. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 213 (Feb. 15, 1984).
254. Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 632 S.W.2d 375, 386 (Tex. App.-Austin 1982),
rev'd sub nom. Smithson v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 213 (Feb. 15, 1984).
255. 632 S.W.2d at 385 n.8. TEX. R. Civ. P. 168(7)(a)(3) provides that the testimony of
an expert witness whose name has not been disclosed either in the initial response to an
appropriate interrogatory or in an amended response at least 14 days before trial shall not be
admitted unless good cause is shown sufficient to require its admission.
256. See Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Meyer, 620 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1981, no writ), discussed in Figari, Graves & Dwyer, supra note 100, at 456; Trubell v. Pat-
ten, 582 S.W.2d 606, 611 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ), discussed in Figari, Texas
Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 34 Sw. L.J. 415, 431-32 (1980).
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of the witness's testimony as an appropriate sanction under the former ver-
sion of rule 168.257 The Texas Supreme Court, reversing the judgment of
the court of appeals, seemed to agree that the amended version of rule 168
would mandate exclusion of the expert's testimony. 258 Nevertheless, the
court held that the old rule did not require exclusion of the testimony and
the trial court had broad discretion to choose the appropriate sanction for
plaintiff's failure to supplement the designation of experts in her interro-
gatory answers. Thus, the issue was simply whether allowance of the ex-
pert's testimony at trial constituted a clear abuse of that discretion. The
supreme court found no such abuse, since the defendant had failed to re-
quest a postponement or continuance of the trial and, therefore, had not
provided the judge with any reasonable alternative to admitting the
testimony.259
In General Motors Corp. v. Lawrence,260 a products liability and wrong-
ful death suit arising from a truck collision, the Texas Supreme Court re-
luctantly acknowledged 26' that mandamus is available to correct a clear
abuse of discretion in a discovery matter.262 The court then held that the
respondent trial judge had abused his discretion in ordering the petitioner
to respond to overly broad discovery requests, which potentially required
General Motors to produce information on all automobiles it had manu-
factured since 1908, as well as data on locomotives and tanks.263
Two cases decided during the survey period involved rules relating to
the introduction of deposition testimony at trial. In Deforest v. Dear264 the
court of appeals held that the trial judge erred in refusing to admit deposi-
tion testimony as evidence because the deposition had not been filed one
day before the trial commenced. Rejecting appellee's contention that rule
212265 required the exclusion of the deposition, the court held that rule 212
deals only with the proper method of objecting to the form or manner of
taking depositions and does not concern their admissibility in general. 266
In Szmalec v. Madro 267 the court held that an unresponsive answer in dep-
osition testimony was properly excluded from evidence since a proper ob-
jection to the answer was registered at the time the deposition was
257. Although the amendments to rule 168 became effective on January 1, 1981, the trial
of the case occurred earlier, and the old version of the rule governed. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at
214.
258. Id. at 519 n.3.
259. Id. at 520.
260. 651 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. 1983).
261. The court bemoaned the fact that it has been flooded with mandamus actions, and
the sanctions provided in the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure have been ineffective in curb-
ing discovery abuse.
262. 651 S.W.2d at 734; accord Commercial Travelers Life Ins. Co. v. Spears, 484
S.W.2d 577, 578 (Tex. 1972); Crane v. Tunks, 160 Tex. 182, 189, 328 S.W.2d 434, 438 (1959).
263. 651 S.W.2d at 734.
264. No. A14-82-439-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no writ).
265. TEX. R. Civ. P. 212.
266. Surprisingly, this holding is in conflict with the decision of a companion court of
appeals. See Zamora v. Romero, 581 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. Civ. App--Corpus Christi 1979, writ
ref d n.r.e.).




In Jackson T Fulgham Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. 269 the plaintiff
served a request asking the defendant to admit it had wholly defaulted on
a note. Although the defendant made a response, the court stated that the
request was an unauthorized inquiry about a matter of law. The court
therefore held that the response was not binding as an admission under
rule 169.270
Finally, and most importantly, the practitioner should be aware that the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure were amended, effective April 1, 1984, by
an order of the supreme court. 27 1 These amendments make substantial
changes in discovery practice, because they (1) consolidate and clarify
rules relating to depositions, (2) alter the time periods for noticing deposi-
tions and responding to requests for admissions, (3) conform Texas discov-
ery practice to federal practice in some respects, and (4) in an effort to curb
discovery abuse, completely revise the rules relating to the scope of discov-
ery and the sanctions for resisting discovery or burdening the opposition
with unnecessary discovery. Unfortunately, the new rules had not yet been
circulated or published at the time this Article was prepared, and they will
be discussed in detail in next year's Survey.
X. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A number of decisions during the survey period discussed the proce-
dural requirements for a summary judgment motion and the adequacy of
the proof supporting the motion. Rule 166-A(c) stipulates that a motion
for summary judgment is to be served twenty-one days before the date of
the hearing on the motion. 272 Appealing from a summary judgment, the
plaintiff in Hudenburg v. Neff 2 73 claimed that the lower court had not com-
plied with the twenty-one-day requirement. The court of appeals, how-
ever, determined that the plaintiff had waived the twenty-one-day notice
requirement by appearing at the summary judgment hearing and by not
filing an affidavit stating the reasons why facts could not be presented in
opposition to the motion. 274 Further, the court held that the plaintiff could
not raise the objection to the lack of notice for the first time on appeal.275
The appellant in Hudenburg also contended that the summary judgment
was improper because the lower court had considered a deposition that
was not on file at the time of the hearing. Rejecting this contention, the
268. Id. at 518.
269. 649 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
270. Id. at 131 (applying TEX. R. Civ. P. 169).
271. See Rules of Civil Procedure, 47 TEX. B.J. (Feb. 1984) (containing special pull-out
section listing newly-adopted rules).
272. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A(c).
273. 643 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. de-
nied, 104 S. Ct. 348, 78 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1984).
274. 643 S.W.2d at 518;see Chandler v. Escobar, 604 S.W.2d 524, 526 (Tex. Civ. App.-
El Paso 1980, no writ) (illustrating TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A(f) waiver of notice defect).
275. 643 S.W.2d at 518; accord City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d
671, 678 (Tex. 1979).
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appellate court noted that the deposition was on file almost five months
before the judgment was entered and that the appellant again had waived
any right to complain on appeal by not objecting to its use by the trial
court.2 7 6 In comparison, the court in Barrow v. Jack's Caofsh Inn277 held
that a deposition filed after a summary judgment had been granted could
not be considered as summary judgment proof and would not support the
judgment on appeal.278
Jackson T Fulgham Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. 279 examined the
adequacy of an affidavit supporting a summary judgment. In this promis-
sory note collection case the corporate plaintiff filed an affidavit wherein
the affiant stated that he was vice-president and agent of the plaintiff and
had "personal knowledge of the facts contained in the motion for sum-
mary judgment. ' 280 The affidavit also stated facts as to the manner in
which the plaintiff obtained the promissory note and the corporation's sta-
tus as holder of the note. Although the court of appeals agreed with the
defendant's contention that an affidavit must affirmatively show how the
affiant became personally familiar with the facts and that a self-serving
recitation is insufficient, 28' it nonetheless concluded that this requirement
had been satisfied by the averment that the affiant was the plaintiffs vice-
president and agent, which demonstrated how he learned or knew of the
facts in the affidavit. 282
Finally, in Teer v. Duddlesten,283 a zoning case, the plaintiff contended
that certain city zoning ordinances submitted in connection with defend-
ant's summary judgment motion were not properly certified because the
city clerk had stated in an affidavit accompanying each ordinance that the
"foregoing" was a true and correct copy when in fact each ordinance fol-
lowed rather than preceded the statement. Overruling this technical con-
tention, the supreme court decided that the order in which the ordinances
were placed in relation to the statement of certification was immaterial
where "the certification clearly refer[red] to the ordinance and no confu-
sion could result. '284 The court also ruled that the ordinances need not be
attached to the summary judgment motion in light of the fact that certified
copies were already on file with the trial court.285
276. 643 S.W.2d at 519.
277. 641 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ).
278. Id. at 625.
279. 649 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
280. Id. at 130.
281. Id.; accord Murfee v. Oquin, 423 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1967, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); see also TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A (delineating affidavit requirements).
282. 649 S.W.2d at 130; accord Barham v. Sugar Creek Nat'l Bank, 612 S.W.2d 78, 80
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
283. 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 544 (July 20, 1983).
284. Id. at 546.
285. Id. Compare State v. Easley, 404 S.W.2d 296, 297 (Tex. 1966) (unattached evidence
should not be considered on summary judgment) with Willoughby v. Jones, 151 Tex. 435,
445, 251 S.W.2d 508, 514 (1952) (allowing uncertified extrinsic documents to be considered
part of trial court record).
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XI. SPECIAL ISSUE SUBMISSION
Rule 272, which sets forth the procedure for making objections to the
charge of the trial court, states that "objections shall in every instance be
presented to the court [and] [t]he judge shall announce his rulings thereon
before reading the charge to the jury. .... -286 In Hernandez v. Montgom-
ery Ward & Co. 287 the Texas Supreme Court served a warning that the
requirements of rule 272 will be interpreted strictly.288 In Hernandez trial
counsel had made a meritorious objection to the charge, but had failed to
secure a ruling on it. The supreme court concluded that any error in the
submission had therefore been waived and, accordingly, no basis existed
for appellate review of the matter.289
A number of appellate decisions during the survey period focused on the
scope of special issues under revised rule 277,290 which formerly required
that special issues be submitted distinctly and separately.29' Rule 277 now
provides: "It shall be discretionary with the court whether to submit sepa-
rate questions with respect to each element of a case or to submit issues
broadly. It shall not be objectionable that a question is general or includes
a combination of elements or issues. ' 292 Giving this language full effect,
the court in Johnson v. Whitehurst293 approved the submission of a single
issue in a medical malpractice action inquiring whether the defendant doc-
tor "was negligent in performing the surgical procedure in question. ' '294
In contrast, the court in Lucas v. Nesbitt295 condemned the submission of a
single issue damage inquiry where the plaintiff had alleged two separate
claims, one for negligence and one under the Texas Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices--Consumer Protection Act.296 The issue inquired as to the sum of
money that would reasonably compensate the plaintiff for any loss result-
ing from the acts of the defendant, but it failed to identify the acts inquired
about. 297 Concluding that the wording of the issue prevented any differen-
tiation of damages between the two claims, the court held that the submis-
sion had the potential for allowing an excessive recovery.298
Walker v. Eason299 is an indication that the improper placement of the
burden of proof within an issue may not always constitute reversible error,
286. TEX. R. Civ. P. 272.
287. 652 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. 1983).
288. Id. at 924; accord Cogburn v. Harbour, 657 S.W.2d 432, 432-33 (Tex. 1983).
289. 652 S.W.2d at 924-25.
290. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277.
291. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 277 (Vernon 1967). See generally Fox v. Dallas Hotel Co., Ill
Tex. 461, 475, 240 S.W. 517, 521 (1922).
292. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277; see Pope & Lowerre, Revised Rule 277-4 Better Special Verdict
Systemfor Texas, 27 Sw. L.J. 577 (1973); Pope & Lowerre, The State of the Special Verdict-
1979, 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1 (1979).
293. 652 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. App.-Houston [pst Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
294. Id. at 448.
295. 653 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ).
296. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
297. 653 S.W.2d at 887.
298. Id.
299. 643 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. 1982).
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even if the subject of a proper objection. In a suit to set aside a deed due to
lack of mental capacity on the part of the grantor, the general instructions
of the trial court advised the jury that the burden to show a lack of mental
capacity was on the persons seeking to set aside the deed; however, the
issue that followed improperly placed the burden on the proponents of the
deed. Acknowledging the error, the supreme court nevertheless concluded
that "[a]lthough special issue number one incorrectly placed the burden of
proof, the instruction in the court's charge correctly placed the burden of
proof."3° ° Since the jury's answer definitively stated that the grantor "did
not have sufficient mental capacity," any error incident to the submission
was harmless. 30
XII. JURY PRACTICE
Rule 281 provides that jurors during deliberations may take with them
the charge and "any written evidence, except the depositions of wit-
nesses. '302 Notwithstanding this permissive language, the supreme court
in First Employees Insurance Co. v. Skinner30 3 concluded that "Rule 281 is
mandatory and that the trial court is required to send all exhibits admitted
into evidence to the jury room during the deliberations of the jury. ' '3° 4
Further, the court held, this requirement is self-operative and is not condi-
tioned upon a request by the jurors or counsel.30 5 The supreme court de-
termined, however, that the trial court's error in not sending the exhibits to
the jury room was harmless because the defendant had been extensively
cross-examined about the exhibits in this case and that the jurors had re-
viewed them at the time they were introduced into evidence. 306
Jury misconduct was the subject of Golden v. Ballard Co. ,307 a negli-
gence case involving the operation of an automobile. The jurors in Golden
had referred to various books and other materials that were not in evi-
dence in order to calculate braking distances, and one of the jurors also
visited the scene of the accident. 30 8 Significantly, some of the jurors admit-
ted that they changed their votes in reaching a verdict as a result of these
activities. The appellate court found that material jury misconduct had
occurred which probably resulted in harm to the appellant.30 9 Accord-
300. Id. at 391.
301. Id.
302. TEX. R. Civ, P. 281.
303. 646 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. 1983).
304. Id. at 172; accord Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Orr, 147 Tex. 383, 391, 215 S.W.2d
862, 866 (1948); United Employers Casualty Co. v. Smith, 145 S.W.2d 249, 250 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1940, writ ref'd); 3 R. MCDONALD, supra note 62, § 14.08.1 (F. Elliot
rev. ed. 1983); 2 R. RAY, supra note 243, § 1468.
305. 646 S.W.2d at 172.
306. Id.
307. 654 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no writ).
308. The jurors made conclusory statements concerning appellant's negligence which
were based upon their reading a Texas Driver's Manual and a college math textbook.
309. 654 S.W.2d at 825. The supreme court has recognized three requirements for estab-
lishing grounds for a new trial based on jury misconduct. The appellant must establish
(1) that the misconduct occurred, (2) that the misconduct was material, and (3) based on the
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ingly, the case was reversed and remanded for a new trial.
A court of appeals examined the propriety of making a "Golden Rule"
closing argument in World Wide Tire Co. v. Brown.3 10 In this personal
injury case, the plaintiffs counsel reminded the jury that "[wie are in-
structed that we should do unto others as we would have them do unto us"
and, in essence, asked the jurors to consider what amount of damages they
would regard as sufficient if they had suffered similar injuries.31' Recog-
nizing that a "Golden Rule" jury argument is not per se improper,312 the
court of appeals nevertheless concluded that the argument at issue went
beyond permitted boundaries because the jurors were asked "to give the
plaintiff what they would want if they were injured, rather than what the
evidence showed plaintiff was entitled to receive as compensation. 313
With respect to juror qualifications, the legislature enacted article 2120a,
which provides that district courts may excuse from jury service persons
with a physical or mental impairment or with an inability to comprehend
or communicate the English language. 314 The person seeking to be ex-
cused under this statute must file an affidavit with the district court. The
affidavit must comply with certain stated requirements. 3
15
XIII. JUDGMENT AND DISMISSAL
A number of issues concerning non-suits were addressed by the appel-
late courts during the survey period. In Greenberg v. Brookshire3# 16 the
plaintiff filed a motion for non-suit and, two days later, the defendant filed
a counterclaim. The trial court refused to dismiss the case, but the
supreme court held on appeal that the plaintiff was entitled to a non-suit or
dismissal immediately upon the filing of his motion. 317 In this connection,
the supreme court noted that a plaintiff is entitled to a non-suit from the
moment he files a written motion or makes an oral motion in open court,
unless the defendant has previously filed pleadings seeking affirmative re-
lief.318 Further, the court expressly disapproved a number of decisions
that had imposed requirements for non-suits other than a written or oral
motion.319
record as a whole, that the misconduct probably resulted in harm to the complaining party.
Flores v. Dosher, 622 S.W.2d 573, 574 (Tex. 1981); Strange v. Treasure City, 608 S.W.2d
604, 606 (Tex. 1980); Fountain v. Ferguson, 441 S.W.2d 506, 507 (Tex. 1969).
310. 644 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
311. Id. at 145.
312. Id. at 145-46; accord Fambrough v. Wagley, 140 Tex. 577, 582-85, 169 S.W.2d 478,
480-82 (1943).
313. 644 S.W.2d at 146 (emphasis in original).
314. Act of May 17, 1983, ch. 132, § 3, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 620 (codified at TEX. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2120a (Vernon Supp. 1984)).
315. Id.
316. 640 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1982).
317. Id. at 871.
318. Id. at 872; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 164.
319. 640 S.W.2d at 872 (disapproving United States Agencies v. Continental Casualty
Co., 555 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ); Cape Oil Co. v. Williams, 427
S.W.2d 122 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968, no writ); Lovelace v. Shawhart, 283 S.W.2d 24
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The liberal nature of the right to non-suit was also demonstrated by
Lfestyle Mobile Homes v. Ricks.320 After allowing the plaintiff to reopen
her case pursuant to rule 270321 and present additional evidence at trial,
the trial court sustained the plaintiffs motion for non-suit. Affirming the
trial court's order of dismissal, the court of appeals held that a non-suit
could have been taken under rule 164 at any time before plaintiff had
rested her case.322 Once the plaintiff had reopened her case, therefore, she
was entitled to move for a non-suit. 323
Essex International Ltd v. Wood 324 illustrates the requirements for rein-
statement of a case that has been dismissed for want of prosecution due to
a plaintiff's failure to appear for trial. Appealing from such a dismissal,
the plaintiff in Essex contended that the trial court had not given notice of
its intent to dismiss and, thus, the lower court should have allowed a rein-
statement of the case. Rejecting this contention, the court of appeals held
that notice of intent to dismiss is not required when the basis for dismissal
is a plaintiffs failure to appear for trial.325 In Paul Stanley Leasing Corp. v.
Hoffman326 the trial court entered a take-nothing judgment because the
corporate plaintiff was not represented by a licensed attorney and, as a
corporation, could not appear on its own behalf.327 The appellate court
agreed with the trial court's rationale, but determined that a take-nothing
judgment, which constituted a ruling on the merits, was inappropriate
under those circumstances. 328 Instead, the lower court should have either
dismissed the case without prejudice or abated the proceedings for a suffi-
cient period of time to allow the plaintiff the opportunity to obtain licensed
counsel.329
The court in Jones v. Jones330 considered the effect of findings of fact
and conclusions of law contained in a judgment. Recognizing that prior
decisions conflicted on this point,331 the court in Jones decided that the
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1955, writ dism'd); Kelly v. W.C. Turnbow Petroleum Corp., 137
S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1940, no writ); Towell v. Towell, 164 S.W. 23 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1914, no writ)).
320. 653 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
321. TEX. R. Civ. P. 270.
322. 653 S.W.2d at 604; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 164. Rule 164 provides: "Upon the trial of
any case at any time before plaintiff has rested his case. . . the plaintiff may take a non-suit
. " TEX. R. Civ. P. 164.
323. 653 S.W.2d at 604.
324. 646 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
325. Id. at 325; TEX. R. Civ. P. 165a (rule governing dismissal for want of prosecution).
326. 651 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
327. Id. at 441; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 7 (allowing pro se representation).
328. 651 S.W.2d at 442.
329. Id.
330. 641 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ).
331. Compare Texas Hauling Contractors Co. v. Rose Sales Co., 565 S.W.2d 240, 244-45
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ) (recitations in judgment cannot be substi-
tuted for separately filed findings of fact); Morin v. Morin, 561 S.W.2d 263, 264-65 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ) (trial court must comply with rule 296 authorizing
findings of fact); Fenlon v. Jaffee, 553 S.W.2d 422, 428 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (where no findings of fact filed, any evidence of probative force will sustain
judgment); Roberson Farm Equip. Co. v. Hill, 514 S.W.2d 796, 802 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texar-
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better reasoned approach is that "[r]ecitations in the judgment itself of
findings of fact and conclusions of law are not proper .... ,,332 Thus, the
appellate courts should not consider these recitations in reviewing the mer-
its of an appeal.
Finally, two statutory enactments concerning judgments went into effect
during the survey period. Article 5069-1.05 was amended to provide that
judgments based on a contract shall earn interest at a rate equal to the
lesser of the rate specified in the contract or eighteen percent. 333 The stat-
ute further specifies that in noncontract actions interest on judgments shall
be determined by the Texas Consumer Credit Commissioner, who shall
compute such rate in accordance with the federal treasury bill rate of inter-
est. 334 Post-judgment interest in noncontract actions may not exceed
twenty percent or be less than ten percent. 335 Article 4413a.1 was added
by the legislature to deal with the taking of default judgments against the
State of Texas or one of its agencies. 336 It delineates certain notice proce-
dures for obtaining a valid default judgment against one of those
parties. 337
XIV. APPELLATE PROCEDURE
With respect to appellate procedure, the most significant decisions dur-
ing the survey period dealt with the types of judgments or orders that are
subject to appeal. In an appeal from a temporary restraining order that in
effect prohibited certain shareholders from voting at an annual meeting,
the court in Global Natural Resources v. Bear, Stearns & Co. 338 held that
the order was appealable. 339 Specifically, the temporary restraining order
was granted without notice or hearing, and an adversary hearing on the
kana 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (in absence of findings of fact appellate court will presume evi-
dence supports verdict); with Hemphill v. S & Q Clothiers, 579 S.W.2d 564, 567 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1978, no writ) (findings contained in judgment of trial court valid); Cot-
tle v. Knapper, 571 S.W.2d 59, 64 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, no writ) (if findings con-
tained in judgment and decree based solely on those findings, they are valid); Davis v.
Davis, 507 S.W.2d 841, 843 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974) (fact that findings
and conclusions are filed together does not affect their validity), rev'd on other grounds, 521
S.W.2d 603 (Tex. 1975).
332. 641 S.W.2d at 344.
333. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1.05, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
334. Id. § 2.
335. Id.
336. Act of Aug. 29, 1983, ch. 659, §§ 1-3, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 4176, 4176-77 (codified
at TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4413a.1 (Vernon Supp. 1984)).
337. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4413a.1 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
338. 642 S.W.2d 852 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ). See Carroll, Review of Tempo-
rary Restraining Orders in Texas-An Appealing Prospect, 46 TEX. B.J. 1406 (1983).
339. 642 S.W.2d at 854. Under Texas law certain interlocutory appeals are available,
including appeals of orders granting or refusing a temporary injunction, or granting or over-
ruling a motion to dissolve a temporary injunction. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 2251
(Vernon 1971), 4662 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1941-1983). Formerly, interlocutory appeals
could also be taken from a district court's venue decision. Act of April 18, 1907, ch. 133,
§§ 1-2, 1907 Tex. Gen. Laws 248, 248-49 (repealed 1983). Pursuant to the comprehensive
revisions to the venue statute, this type of appeal is no longer available. Act of June 17,
1983, ch. 385, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2119.
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matter was not set until four days after the shareholder's annual meeting.
Under those circumstances, the court of appeals concluded that the trial
court's order was "tantamount to a temporary injunction because the effect
of it on the parties went beyond protecting the status quo for a ten-day
period. ' 340 In Schlipf v. Exxon Corp. 341 the supreme court discussed the
requirements of finality for the purpose of appellate review. One of the
parties claimed that the trial court's judgment was not final because it did
not dispose of a claim for prejudgment interest, and moved to dismiss the
appeal for want of jurisdiction. Recognizing that a final judgment is one
disposing of all issues and parties in the case, 34 2 the supreme court never-
theless ruled that the judgment was final and subject to appeal, because it
contained a provision that "all claims and/or causes of action herein as-
serted by all parties herein and not herein granted are hereby in all things
denied and concluded. '343 Accordingly, the prejudgment interest claim
was disposed of pursuant to that catch-all provision. Finally, Aubin v. Ter-
ritorial Mortgage Company of America344 held that an order disqualifying
counsel is interlocutory and hence is not appealable. 345
Saenz Motors v. Big H. Auto Auctions, Inc. 346 demonstrates that an ap-
pellee may need to prosecute his own separate appeal in order to have
certain points considered by the appellate court. In Saenz Motors the
plaintiff appealed only from the portion of trial court's judgment that
failed to treble its damages under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act and to
award attorney's fees to the plaintiff. The defendant contended that the
lower court had erred in not awarding it attorney's fees on an indemnifica-
tion claim against a third party. The court of appeals held the appellee's
points of error could not be considered because it had not filed a separate
appeal and the appellant had limited the scope of its appeal.347 The court
noted that a separate appeal by the appellee "is necessary for the present-
ment of points of error. . . when the judgment is definitely severable and
the appellant strictly limits the scope of its appeal to a severable portion
thereof."3
48
One significant development should be noted in connection with the
340. 642 S.W.2d at 854; see also Plant Process Equip. Inc. v. Harris, 579 S.W.2d 53, 54-55
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ) (injunction dissolved); Ellis v. Vander-
slice, 486 S.W.2d 155, 158-59 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972, no writ) (county clerk immune
from temporary restraining order). For purposes of appellate review, the court in Global
Natural Resources also held that it was proper to consider the original pleadings, orders, and
other papers from the trial court rather than merely a partial transcript prepared by the
district clerk, particularly in light of the parties' stipulation that such original papers could
be used in lieu of a transcript. 642 S.W.2d at 854.
341. 644 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. 1982).
342. Id. at 454; accord North E. Indep. School Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 895
(Tex. 1966).
343. 644 S.W.2d at 455.
344. 640 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no writ).
345. Id. at 742-43.
346. 653 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, writ granted).
347. Id. at 526.
348. Id; accord Cameron & Willacy Counties Community Projects, Inc. v. Gonzalez, 614
S.W.2d 585, 588 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
[Vol. 38
TEXAS CIVIL PROCEDURE
codification of the new Texas Rules of Evidence. Previously, Texas courts
have held that hearsay will not support a verdict, irrespective of whether
an objection is made in the trial court, and a party may raise the question
for the first time on appeal under a "no evidence" or "insufficiency"
point.349 Effective September 1, 1983, rule 802 of the new Texas Rules of
Evidence changes this practice. Rule 802 provides: "Inadmissible hearsay
admitted without objection shall not be denied probative value merely be-
cause it is hearsay. 350
Finally, the scope of appellate court jurisdiction was altered by two stat-
utory changes. Article 1821 was amended to provide that, as a general
rule, writs of error to the supreme court shall not be allowed (1) in cases of
child custody, support, or reciprocal support; or (2) in appeals from orders
or judgments in suits in which a temporary injunction has been granted or
refused or where a motion to dissolve has been granted or overruled.
35
'
The practitioner should bear in mind that a writ of error to the supreme
court in such cases may still be available under article 1728.352 A more
significant amendment is the expansion of the mandamus jurisdiction of
the court of appeals. Under revised article 1824, the court of appeals may
now issue "all writs of Mandamus agreeable to the principles of law regu-
lating such writs."' 353 For example, if a party seeks a writ of mandamus
related to a district court discovery order, then the petition for the writ
should be filed with the court of appeals rather than with the supreme
court, as under prior practice.
XV. RES JUDICATA
As noted in prior surveys, 354 a number of Texas courts of appeals have
held that mutuality of parties is no longer necessary in Texas for applica-
tion of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 355 Indeed, in Bonniwell v. Beech
349. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Klein, 160 Tex. 61, 66-67, 325 S.W.2d 376, 380 (1959); Exparte
Ramirez, 577 S.W.2d 261, 263 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); H. WENDORF & D. SCHLEUTER,
TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 170 (1983).
350. TEX. R. EVID. 802.
351. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 839, §§ 1.3, .6, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 4767, 4767-68 (codi-
fied at TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1821 (Vernon Supp. 1984)). Article 1821 also pro-
vides that a writ of error to the supreme court is not permissible in a number of other types
of cases. id.
352. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1728 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
353. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 839, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 4767, 4768-69 (codified at TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1824 (Vernon Supp. 1984)); see A American Stamp & Novelty
Mfg. Co. v. Wettman, 658 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ) (man-
damus denied).
354. See Figari, Graves & Dwyer, supra note 32, at 321; Figari, Graves & Dwyer, supra
note 100, at 667.
355. See, e.g., Tobbon v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 616 S.W.2d 243, 246 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1981, writ refd n.r.e.) (doctrine of mutality has been modified); Baker v.
Story, 564 S.W.2d 166, 167 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, no writ) (no requirement of
mutuality on part of defendants); Hardy v. Fleming, 553 S.W.2d 790, 792-93 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (finding no compelling need to insist upon mutuality).
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Aircraft Co. ,356 the most recent pronouncement by a Texas court on the
subject, the court of appeals held that a defendant airplane manufacturer
could use the doctrine of collateral estoppel offensively to obtain judgment
on its cross-claim against a co-defendant because all necessary issues of
fact had been adjudicated in a previous action involving a different plain-
tiff.357 The anxious practitioner awaiting guidance on the subject from the
Texas Supreme Court, however, will have to wait until another day. The
supreme court reviewed the Bonniwell decision during the survey period
and initially affirmed the lower court's opinion, thereby adopting its rea-
soning with respect to mutuality of parties and offensive use of collateral
estoppel. 35 8 On rehearing, however, a sharply divided court withdrew its
original opinion and reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. 359
Bonniwell was one of five lawsuits resulting from a fatal airplane crash.
The plaintiff joined both the airplane manufacturer and the air carrier that
operated the plane as defendants in the suit, and each of those defendants
filed a cross-claim for indemnity and contribution against the other. One
of the other lawsuits stemming from the accident, however, proceeded to
trial first. The judgment in that earlier suit, which involved the same de-
fendants as Bonniwell and identical causes of action, denied the manufac-
turer's claim for indemnity from the air carrier, but only because the jury's
fact findings absolved the manufacturer altogether of liability for the
crash. 360
On appeal, the supreme court initially held that since the relative liabili-
ties between the manufacturer and the air carrier were ascertained in the
first suit, the defendants were precluded from relitigating those fixed liabil-
ities between themselves in the Bonniwe/I suit.361 Further, the court con-
cluded that an offensive application of collateral estoppel was appropriate
in the case because "the derivative claims of identical parties [were] based
upon issues identical to those litigated in [the] prior suit."' 362 On rehearing,
however, the supreme court focused more on the effect that the manufac-
turer's judgment of indemnity would have on the plaintiffs. Because the
plaintiffs had previously settled with the carrier and agreed to indemnify it
from further liability, the award of indemnity by the trial court to the man-
ufacturer would operate directly against the plaintiffs and eliminate their
356. 633 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982), affd in part, rev'd in part,
27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 140 (Jan. 4, 1984).
357. 633 S.W.2d at 561.
358. 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 259, 263 (Mar. 9, 1983) (opinion withdrawn).
359. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 140 (Jan. 4, 1984) (6-3 opinion).
360. The jury failed to find the manufacturer negligent or responsible for a design defect
in the airplane's control mechanism. In a separate finding the jury apportioned liability 75%
to the carrier and 25% to another defendant in the action.
361. 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 261. According to the court, mutuality was required only as to
the party against whom the plea of collateral estoppel was asserted. Id. at 260. Thus, collat-
eral estoppel applied in the second suit even though it was brought by a different plaintiff
than in the first suit.
362. Id. at 261 (citing Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Smith Material Corp., 616 F.2d I 1,
114-15 (5th Cir. 1980)).
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cause of action against the manufacturer.363 The court held that an appli-
cation of collateral estoppel in this fashion, against a person who has not
had his day in court either as a party to the prior suit or as one in privity to
a party, amounts to a denial of due process.364 Further, the court found
that principles of collateral estoppel did not support the manufacturer's
claim for indemnity, irrespective of the plaintiffs dilemma, because the
fact issue in the first suit, comparing the respective liabilities of the defend-
ants, was not essential to the judgment.365 In this connection the court
observed that the findings in the first suit exonerating the manufacturer of
all fault for the crash eliminated the manufacturer as a joint tortfeasor. A
finding of no fault obviated the need to include the manufacturer in the
separate issue on comparative negligence. 366 Since the comparative negli-
gence issue alone related to the cross-actions for indemnity, and the manu-
facturer was not properly includable in that issue, the court could find no
essential issue of fact resolved in the first suit that would support the man-
ufacturer's claim to indemnity in the second suit.367
XVI. MISCELLANEOUS
Attorney's Fees. Article 2226, the general attorney's fees statute gov-
erning actions based on contracts, provides that it shall not apply to insur-
ance contracts issued by insurers subject to articles 3.62, 3.62-1, 21.21 and
21.21-2 of the Texas Insurance Code. 368 Claiming that all insurance con-
tracts are subject to the Insurance Code, the defendant insurance company
in Texas Farmers Insurance Co. v. Hernandez369 argued that article 2226
was not applicable in a suit to recover the proceeds of a fire insurance
policy. The court of appeals, however, concluded that the effect of article
2226 is that attorney's fees are recoverable in all suits on insurance con-
tracts. 370 According to the court, if the plaintiff sues under one of the
Insurance Code provisions that article 2226 specifically mentions, the at-
torney's fees statute applicable to that specific provision will control the
363. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 142. The award of indemnity to the manufacturer would
operate this way because any judgment the plaintiffs obtained against the manufacturer
would be collected from the carrier, who in turn was to receive reimbursement from the
plaintiff under the settlement agreement.
364. Id. (citing Benson v. Wanda Petroleum Co., 468 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex. 1971)). As
the dissent observes, however, the plaintiffs dilemma in Bonniwell, unlike the situation in
Benson, resulted from their voluntary agreement to settle with the air carrier. 27 Tex. Sup.
Ct. J. at 145 (McGee, J., dissenting).
365. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 142.
366. Id.
367. Id. The court's reasoning on this point appears somewhat tenuous. Clearly the
manufacturer need not have been included in the comparative negligence issue, but only
because the jury had already determined that the manufacturer was not at fault. Certainly
this latter finding was essential to the judgment and, as the dissent pointed out, the finding
seems conclusive on the issue of derivative liability as well. Id. at 145 (McGee, J.,
dissenting).
368. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
369. 649 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983, writ ref d n.r.e.).
370. Id. at 124; accord Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Burke, 614 S.W.2d 847, 850
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1981, writ ref d n.r.e.).
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award; otherwise, recovery is permitted under article 2226. 371
In Hernandez the court also discussed what constitutes reasonable attor-
ney's fees within the purview of article 2226. The evidence offered was in
the form of an attorney's testimony that a one-third contingent fee was a
normal, standard, and reasonable fee. The appellate court addressed the
adequacy of this evidence and held that "contingent fee evidence will sup-
port an award of attorney's fees under article 2226 if the evidence satisfies
the tests stated in the statute, is otherwise admissible and is sufficiently
detailed to permit the fact finder to calculate the award. ' 372 The cautious
practitioner should note, however, that this holding appears in conflict
with a number of Texas decisions that conclude testimony as to the
amount of a contingent fee does not constitute any evidence of a reason-
able attorney's fee. 373
The plaintiff in City Towing Associates, Inc. v. Labatt Co .374 claimed on
appeal that, having prevailed on a quantum meruit claim, it was entitled to
recover attorney's fees under article 2226. The court of appeals affirmed
the lower court's denial of such fees and ruled that article 2226 was inap-
plicable because the plaintiffs services had not been provided directly to
the defendant. 375 Finally, article 5453 now provides that a party filing a
mechanic's lien for labor and materials may recover attorney's fees in a
collection suit if the lien has been fixed and secured for 180 days without
payment.376 If the lien is not valid or enforceable, however, the owner,
original contractor, subcontractor, or any surety under any bond may re-
cover attorney's fees from the lien claimant incurred in the defense against
the lien claim.377
Disqualification of Trial Judge. Rule 18a, which controls the procedures
for disqualification of a trial judge, specifies that any party may file a mo-
tion for recusal at least ten days before the date set for trial or other hear-
ing in trial court. 378 In Autry v. Autry379 the motion for recusal was filed
only one day before a scheduled hearing. The court of appeals held that
under those circumstances the failure of the appellant to comply with the
ten-day notice provision barred any complaint on appeal with respect to
371. 649 S.W.2d at 124.
372. Id, at 125; accord Wenk v. City Nat'l Bank, 613 S.W.2d 345, 352 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Tyler 1981, no writ).
373. See, e.g., Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Turner, 620 S.W.2d 670, 675 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 198 1, no writ) (reversed and remanded for court's determination of reasonable
fees); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Uribe, 595 S.W.2d 554, 570 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979,
writ refd n.r.e.) (reasonable fee is amount a litigant would pay for prosecuting case).
374. 644 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
375. Id. at 857.
376. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5453, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
377. Id. § 5.
378. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a. Rule 18a(e) apparently provides an exception to the normal
time limit: "If within ten days of the date set for trial or other hearing a judge is assigned to
a case, the motion shall be filed at the earliest practicable time prior to the commencement
of the trial or other hearing." Id. 18a(e).
379. 646 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, no writ).
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the motion.380 Similarly, in Exparte Fernandez38 l the court held that the
failure to comply with the ten-day time limit foreclosed any objection on
appeal about recusal.382
Claim Referral by Agreement to Retired Judge. The legislature enacted a
new statute providing for the use of "special" judges. 38 3 Pursuant to an
agreement of the parties, the district court may order the referral of a case
to a retired district judge.384 The agreement of the parties, as reflected in a
motion filed by both parties, must include (1) a request for referral, (2) a
waiver of the right to a jury trial, (3) a statement as to the issues to be
referred, (4) a specification of the time and place of the trial, and (5) a
statement as to the name of the judge, his agreement to hear the case, and
the fee he is to receive. 385 Generally, the same rules and statutes relating
to procedure and evidence in the district court apply to a trial before the
special judge. 386 The special judge also has the same powers as an active
district judge, except he may not award attorney's fees to a party or hold a
person in contempt unless the person is a witness before him.387 The trial
before a special judge may not be held in a public courtroom, and public
employees may not be involved in the trial during regular working
hours.388 The special judge's verdict stands as a verdict of the district
court, and the right to appeal is preserved. 389
Electronic Filing of Documents. Apparently anticipating the future growth
in the use of computers and related equipment, the legislature enacted arti-
cle 29f, which provides that litigants may now file documents by electronic
transmission to court clerks. 390 This new form of filing is conditioned
upon the particular court in question having established a system for re-
ceiving the electronically transmitted information from an electronic copy-
ing device and the approval of the system by the Texas Supreme Court.391
380. Id. at 588; see Limon v. State, 632 S.W.2d 812, 815 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1982, no writ) (voluntary manslaughter case). The court inAutry noted that a reversal
would have been required if a timely motion had been filed because the record did not
affirmatively reflect that the trial judge had complied with rule 18a. 646 S.W.2d at 588.
Under rule 18a the trial judge must forward the motion to the presiding judge of the district
so that another judge can be assigned to hear the motion. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a(d).
381. 645 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983, no writ).
382. Id. at 638.
383. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 917, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 5060 (codified at TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 200d, §§ 1-13 (Vernon Supp. 1984)).
384. Id. §§ 1, 3.
385. Id. § 2.
386. Id. § 5.
387. Id. § 6.
388. Id. § 10.
389. Id. §§ il, 13.
390. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 732, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 4505 (codified at TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 29f (Vernon Supp. 1984)).
391. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 29f, § l(a) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
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